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Abstract 
 
 In the history of the American republic, no branch of government has increased its powers 
more than the Executive Branch and no area of policy, arguably, has caused as much intense 
inter-branch conflict in recent years as immigration. Since the last major bipartisan immigration 
reform in 1986, Presidents have time and again exercised their executive powers to make 
immigration policy. Most of these exercises of power have been in the form of executive orders 
and actions granting reprieve from deportation to groups of undocumented immigrants. With the 
rise of illegal immigration in the 90s and steady decline in recent years, the U.S. currently faces 
an undocumented population of roughly 11 million. Which branch of government has the power 
to enact policy regarding these immigrants is heavily disputed. The current legal battle for 
constitutional authority in immigration is Texas v. United States, where 26 states have sued 
President Obama for abuse of executive power in creating an extension of Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful 
Permanent Residents (DAPA), programs which would grant reprieve from deportation to up to 
4.3 million undocumented immigrants and issue them work authorization documents. To assess 
whether President Obama has the constitutional authority to promulgate these programs, this 
paper applies political scientist Mariah Zeisberg’s relational conception model to analyze the 
inter-branch conflict on immigration between the Legislative Branch, traditionally charged with 
creating immigration policy, and the Executive Branch, traditionally charged with enforcing it. 
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I. Introduction 
 In 2012, President Barack Obama created the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals 
(DACA) program, by which “young adults brought to the U.S. illegally as children [became 
eligible to] apply for temporary deportation relief.”1 Today, roughly 600,000 of the 1.2 million 
eligible have received relief and work permits.2 In November of 2014, Obama announced further 
major executive actions: the expansion of DACA and creation of the Deferred Action for Parents 
of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA), intended to provide reprieve from 
deportation to the parents of U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents.3 This series of 
executive actions is unprecedented in the history of presidential executive actions primarily 
because of its collective potential to affect up to five million undocumented immigrants. 
 Unlike DACA that has since prevailed in legal challenges, most notably in Arizona 
Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer (2014) filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
which the court ruled unconstitutional Arizona’s policy denying driver’s licenses to DACA 
recipients, these new executive actions currently face major legal obstacles. In February 2015, 26 
states brought suit challenging the president’s use of executive power in the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas in Texas v. United States. The court blocked the actions 
on procedural grounds through a preliminary injunction, that is, an indefinite halt to the 
implementation proceedings of the two programs which were set to commence in early 2015.4 
                                                 
1 Drew Desilver, Executive actions on immigration have long history (Washington D.C.: Pew 
Research Center, November 21, 2014), accessed October 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/11/21/executive-actions-on-immigration-have-long-history/. 
2 Zenen Jaimes Perez,  How DACA Has Impacted the Lives of Undocumented Young People 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, November 19, 2014), accessed February 2016, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2014/11/19/101868/how-daca-has-
improved-the-lives-of-undocumented-young-people/.  
3 Ibid. 
4 Judge Hanen, who delivered the Opinion, ruled that the federal government, in creating the 
DAPA and expanded DACA programs, was in violation of the the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
for failure to fulfill the “notice and comment requirement.” The Act requires a notice and comment period 
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Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Justice asked the court for an emergency stay (i.e. stop the 
injunction from being in effect) to allow the programs to proceed to implementation. However, 
the stay was denied in a 2-1 decision on May 26, 2015.5 On November 9, 2015, the District Court 
ruling was upheld in a 2-1 decision made by the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On 
November 20, 2015, exactly a year after the programs were announced, the Department of Justice 
filed a petition to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.6 On January 19, 2016 the petition 
was granted. The court is scheduled to hear arguments on April 18, 2016 and make a ruling in 
June of 2016.  
 With the clock ticking in President Obama’s last quarter in office, the debate surrounding 
his executive actions’ constitutionality remains a hot-button issue. While the president claims he 
acted well within his discretionary power to enforce existing immigration law amid congressional 
stalemate on comprehensive immigration reform, his critics conversely argue he abused and 
overstepped his executive powers, calling his actions essentially lawmaking. Which argument is 
constitutionally sound? This research paper will answer this question by analyzing the inter-
branch conflict over constitutional authority in immigration. Since the Legislative Branch has 
irresponsibly failed to meet its institutional obligations to reform the nation’s outdated 
immigration laws, this paper will argue that the Executive Branch, in responsibly exercising its 
institutional strengths and enforcing existing immigration law with the resources it has at its 
disposal, has generated the constitutional authority to promulgate and implement DACA/DAPA. 
                                                 
as part of the rulemaking procedure “under which a proposed rule is published in the Federal Register and 
is open to comment by the general public.” For more information see: 
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/2578  
5 Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 8657 (5th Cir. May 26, 2015). 
6 “Writ of certiorari” is “a type of writ by which an appellate court decides to review a case at its 
discretion” as defined by the Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School. Petition for a writ of 
certiorari (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/us-v-texas-
petition.pdf https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/writ_of_certiorari.  
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 The research paper is structured as follows: Part II will provide an overview of executive 
powers, differentiating the types of powers at the president’s disposal and their constitutional 
origins. Then, the section will discuss constitutional theories of executive power, including the 
renowned presidential powers framework developed by Justice Robert H. Jackson in Youngstown 
Sheet &Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952) and the “Unitary Executive Theory,” which came to fruition 
during the Reagan Administration. Part III will run through a history of major executive actions 
on immigration since the last bipartisan immigration reform in 1986. Part IV will analyze the 
constitutionality of President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on immigration. Next, the section 
will outline key elements of the ongoing constitutionality debate and an overview of the judicial 
challenges to DACA/DAPA including the current lawsuit, Texas v. United States. The 
constitutional analysis will begin with an analysis of the actions under the Youngstown 
framework and discuss the framework’s limitations in assessing executive power in modern 
government and particularly in immigration. Then, the actions will be analyzed under political 
scientist Mariah Zeisberg’s relational conception model, created to assess constitutional war 
authority. Part V will conclude the paper with a discussion of the broader implications of inter-
branch conflict over constitutional authority in immigration and discuss the practical benefits of 
DACA/DAPA to America’s citizens. 
 
II. Overview of Executive Powers 
A.  What are the President’s Executive Powers?  
 The president, as the head of the Executive Branch, is an important figure of U.S. 
government with powers that impact virtually all domains of public policy. Renowned for his 
influential conception of presidential power, political scientist Richard Neustadt contended that 
presidential power and persuasion are synonymous, that is, “if a president is to enjoy a measure 
 9 
of success, he must master the art of persuasion.”7 According to Neustadt, the ability to persuade 
defines political (and presidential) power in that it requires the convincing of other political 
actors by bargaining and negotiating in order to do things that a president cannot accomplish on 
his or her own. Formal powers, on the other hand, are a “painful last resort, a forced response to 
the exhaustion of other remedies.”8 However, this conception has been challenged by both the 
increase in size and importance of the Executive Branch and the rise of unilateral presidential 
actions, which political scientist William G. Howell calls “the virtual antithesis of bargaining and 
persuading.”9  
1. The U.S. Constitution 
 To  understand fully the broader puzzle that are unilateral presidential actions is to 
understand fully the president’s formal executive powers and their constitutional origins, referred 
as the “fundamental and irreducible core of presidential power” by political scientist Richard 
Pious.10 Article II of the Constitution contains an explicit list of presidential powers which 
include the power to appoint and nominate officers, the power to grant reprieves and pardons 
against offenses, and as Commander in Chief of the United States Armed Forces, the power to 
make treaties. However, the Constitution is also ambiguous—perhaps intentional, perhaps not—
when it comes to the powers and responsibilities of the president, an issue that has been debated 
by political scientists and presidents alike for decades. Political scientist Dr. Ryan J. Barilleaux 
calls this phenomena “the presidential conundrum,” the idea that the Constitution itself 
                                                 
7 William G. Howell, Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 8. 
8 Ibid., 9. 
9 Ibid., 15. 
10 Christopher S. Kelley, Executing the Constitution: Putting the President Back into the 
Constitution (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 4.  
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encourages presidents to test the limits of the Constitution.11 He argues that, to resolve this 
conundrum, presidents engage in venture constitutionalism by taking risks that push the 
boundaries of constitutional authority. In fact, presidents, in their effort to either push their policy 
objectives and/or circumvent a hostile Congress, have used this ambiguity as justification for 
claiming broader powers. But what are the boundaries? The Vesting Clause and the Take Care 
Clause provide some guidance.  
a) The Vesting Clause  
 Arguably “the most plausible constitutional warrant for broad executive powers” is the 
Vesting Clause.12 The Vesting Clause states: “the executive power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America.”13 The Vesting clause is controversial because it is not clear 
what “the executive power” refers to: does it refer to the powers explicitly outlined in Article II, 
or does it confer some broader, not explicitly stated powers? According to political scientist 
Graham Dodds it may be the latter. Whilst comparing the language of the Executive Vesting 
Clause in Article II and the Legislative Vesting Cause in Article I, Dodds notes one particular and 
crucial difference: the words “herein granted.” Article I of the Constitution outlines the powers 
and responsibilities of the the Legislative Branch (i.e. Congress). Much like Article II, Article I 
also includes a Vesting Clause of its own which states: “all legislative power herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress.”14 The “herein granted,” interpreted to mean the powers and 
responsibilities outlined in Article I, is missing in the Executive Branch’s Vesting Clause. The 
                                                 
11 Ryan J. Barilleaux, “Venture Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of the Presidency,” in 
Executing the Constitution: Putting the President Back into the Constitution, ed. Christopher S. Kelley 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 38. 
12 Graham G. Dodds, Take up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential Directives in American Politics 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 32.  
13 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, § 3. 
14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
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mere absence of these two words has lead certain political scientists to believe that “there is an 
unspecified ‘residuum’ of executive power from which the president can draw from consisting of 
all powers that are arguably executive in nature and that are neither specifically granted nor 
specifically prohibited in the Constitution.”15 That is to say, in short, the president has broader 
executive powers at his disposal.  
b) The Take Care Clause 
 The Take Care Clause states that the president “shall take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”16 Dodds states that in one view, the clause instructs the president to administer statutes 
carefully and on the other, the clause invokes a broader scope of action similar to the “necessary 
and proper” clause of Article I. Political scientist Richard Pious agrees. Pious argues that 
presidents, like Congress, “may take actions [that are] ‘necessary and proper’ to put their 
executive powers into effect, having all the means at their disposal that the Constitution does not 
forbid, and they combine their constitutional powers with statutes Congress passed to expand 
their administrative powers, even asserting their own reading of implicit provisions of statutory 
law.”17 In addition, presidents may stretch the the meaning of the Constitution under certain 
circumstances through prerogative governance, whereby presidents use prerogative power when 
they believe they must act to resolve major public problems. Howell recounts that John Locke, 
English philosopher of the Enlightenment, first spoke about prerogative powers, stating that 
“certain public officials ought to enjoy ‘the power to act according to discretion, for the publick 
good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it.’”18 It is these prerogative 
                                                 
15 Dodds, Take up Your Pen, 31. 
16 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, § 3. 
17 Richard M. Pious, “Public Law and the ‘Executive’ Constitution,” in Executing the Constitution: 
Putting the President Back into the Constitution, ed. Christopher S. Kelley (Albany: State University of 
New York, 2006), 14. 
18 Howell, Power without Persuasion, 16. 
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powers that presidents such as FDR used as justification for acting unilaterally when neither the 
Legislature nor the Constitution had mandated appropriate powers. Claims of prerogative powers, 
however, obviously are in deep tension with maintaining the rule of law. 
2. Unilateral Presidential Directives 
 The ambiguity of the Vesting Clause and Take Care Clause of Article II of the 
Constitution offer some rationale for considerable executive power. But what kinds exactly? In 
his book, Take up Your Pen: Unilateral Presidential Directives in American Politics, Dodds 
names these powers “unilateral presidential directives,” UPDs. UPDs, which presidents have long 
relied on to enact their preferences across a wide range of policy areas, are documents that the 
president issues to direct the activities of the Executive Branch.19 Dodds states that UPDs “serve 
to prompt congressional action, to preclude it, or to circumvent a recalcitrant Congress.”20 
Furthermore, UPDs are not anomalies. In fact, there are over two dozen different types. 
Presidents predominantly issue executive orders, proclamations and memoranda, most frequently 
in times of crises. In fact, as political scientist William G. Howell states, “throughout the history 
of the Republic, the public, Congress, and the courts have looked to the president to guide the 
nation through foreign and domestic crises.”21  
 In immigration, presidents often have issued executive orders and executive actions, terms 
that by definition “are not interchangeable” although in practice, they often are.22 Executive 
orders, unlike executive actions, have a legal definition and are published in the Federal Register. 
By definition, “executive orders and proclamations are directives or actions by the President, 
                                                 
19 Dodds, Take up Your Pen, 4. 
20 Ibid., 4.  
21 Howell, Power without Persuasion, 4. 
22 John Contrubis, Executive Orders and Proclamations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, March 9, 1999), accessed March 2016. 
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[that] when they are founded on the authority of the President derived from the Constitution or 
statute, they may have the force and effect of law…[and] in the narrower sense are generally 
directed to, and govern actions by, Government officials and agencies, [while they] usually affect 
private individuals only indirectly.”23 Stated differently, “executive orders are directives issued 
by the president to officers of the executive branch, requiring them to take an action, stop a 
certain type of activity, alter policy, change management practices, or accept a delegation of 
authority under which they henceforth be responsible for the implementation of law.”24 Executive 
orders and other UPDs are as wide or narrow as the Legislative Branch, the Judicial Branch, and 
the Constitution permit. 
a) Authority and Limits 
 The use of these directives are both justified and limited by the Legislative Branch, the 
lawmaking institution of the U.S. government, the Constitution and the Courts. First, Congress 
may delegate power to the president to take a certain action—which happens frequently—just as 
it can limit the president from acting on any given issue, that is, if Congress passes a law, the 
president cannot override it by a UPD. Although it has the authority to override UPDs either by 
passing laws or amending existing laws to explicitly strike down the UPD, Congress seldom 
does. In fact, Congress can limit or eliminate certain UPDs taken by the president or may vote to 
withhold the funds that would be necessary to implement a UPD, which Dodds remarks is 
“tantamount to nullifying the directive.”25 (Congress tried this very tactic in December of 2014 
by almost defunding the Department of Homeland Security over President Obama’s 2014 
executive actions on immigration.) Second, UPDs may also be justified by the Constitution (e.g. 
                                                 
23 “Executive Orders and Proclamations: A Study on the Use of Presidential Powers,” Staff of 
House Comm. On Government Operations, 85th Congress, 1st Session (1957). 
24 Howell, Power without Persuasion, 17. 
25 Dodds, Take up Your Pen, 11. 
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Article II, § 2 gives the president the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against 
the United States), though most are not. Howell asserts that the power of unilateral action is 
mentioned “nowhere.”26  Instead, most UPDs are justified by expansive constitutional 
interpretations of Article II. Third, UPDs may be limited by the Judicial Branch, the U.S. 
Supreme Court and other courts, by being struck down as unconstitutional. In sum, John 
Contrubis writes that “the authority for executive actions and orders must be based upon: (1) the 
Constitution; (2) statures or treaties; or (3) the President’s inherent authority to ensure that the 
laws are ‘faithfully executed.’”27 But, as Howell notes, “the fact of the matter is that presidents 
have always made law without the explicit consent of Congress, sometimes by acting upon 
general powers delegated to them by different congresses, past and present, and other times by 
reading new executive authorities in the Constitution itself.”28 
 What make UPDs particularly fascinating is the tension they have with two core 
constitutional doctrines: the separation of powers and checks and balances. Dodds notes, “insofar 
as UPDs enable the Executive to legislate unilaterally, they violate the separation of powers,” and 
“insofar as the two branches have often been unable or unwilling to resist or reverse them, [they] 
also call into question the efficacy of traditional checks and balances.”29 Howell further notes that 
these UPDs are “unlike any other power formally granted to the president” for two reasons: 1) the 
president makes policy first and thereby places a “burden” on Congress and the courts to respond, 
either by passing a law or ruling against the president, or do nothing; and 2) the president acts 
                                                 
26 Howell, Power without Persuasion, 14. 
27 Contrubis, Executive Orders and Proclamations, 12. 
28 Howell, Power without Persuasion, 13. 
29 Dodds, Take up Your Pen, 11. 
 15 
alone, rather than depend on any other institution, particularly Congress, to enact his or her 
legislative agenda.30 
 
B.   Major Constitutional Theories of Executive Power  
 It is indisputable among political scientists like Dr. Ryan J. Barilleaux that executive 
power, or narrowly defined, presidential power, is much broader today than it ever was in the 
history of the American republic. Although this power has  “waxed and waned” at times, it has 
generally increased over the course of history, a phenomenon economist Rexford G. Tugwell, 
who worked as a policy advisor to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, called the “enlargement of 
the presidency.”31 With this increase in executive power, presidents have pushed and tested the 
limits of their constitutional authority and in doing so, have devised theories of executive power 
to defend their actions. 
 Acclaimed “the architect of both the theoretical and practical foundations of the modern 
presidency,” President Theodore Roosevelt was the first major pioneer of enhancing the power of 
the national government and the president through his stewardship theory.32 In short, the 
stewardship theory held that the president can do anything not explicitly forbidden by the 
Constitution or by laws passed by Congress. President William Howard Taft’s constitutional 
theory, sometimes called a “Whig” (or “strict constructionist” or “literalist”) theory of 
presidential power, stated that the president derived his powers strictly from powers enumerated 
                                                 
30 Howell, Power without Persuasion, 15. 
31 Barilleaux, “Venture Constitutionalism,” 37. 
32 Randall L. Robinson, “The Stewardship Theory of the Presidency: Theodore Roosevelt’s 
Political Theory of the Republican Progressive Statesmanship and the Foundation of the Modern 
Presidency,” The Claremont Graduate School (1997).  
 16 
in the Constitution or granted by Congress.33 That is, Taft believed the powers of the president 
should be so limited as to preserve constitutional democracy, separation of powers, and to resist 
“radical majoritarianism.” By contrast, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration is arguably the 
first to employ and defend prerogative powers in the context of commanding political positions. 
In the prerogative theory of presidential power, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, building on 
Theodore Roosevelt’s views,  decided “the presidential prerogative ‘to take care’ that the laws be 
faithfully executed meant that the laws should be executed based on his interpretation of their 
meaning.”34 For FDR, this meant broader executive powers in emergency situations such as war. 
Pious states that “presidents claim that they, as agents of the American people, exercise these 
powers when the Constitution is silent [and] they claim on rare occasions a Lockean 
Prerogative—the responsibility in an emergency to act without prescription of the law, and 
sometimes against it.”35 Presidents, in his view, interpret the oath to “preserve, protect, and 
defend the Constitution” as also allowing them, in certain circumstances, “dispensing Power” to 
dispense with the execution of the law.36 
 The Supreme Court and the Reagan Administration have also devised different theories of 
presidential power. The first is a presidential power framework created by Justice Robert H. 
Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and the second is the “Unitary Executive 
Theory.”  
                                                 
33 Michael J. Korzi, “Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers: A Reconsideration of William Howard 
Taft’s “Whig” Theory of Presidential Leadership,” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 
2003): 305-324, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/27552486.pdf?acceptTC=true.  
34 Richard M. Pious, “The Historical Presidency: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Destroyer Deal: 
Normalizing Prerogative Power,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 42, No. 1 (March 2012), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.03948.x/pdf.  
35 Richard M. Pious, “Prerogative Power and Presidential Politics,” The Oxford Handbook of the 
American Presidency (May 2010): 459, 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001/oxfordhb-
9780199238859-e-20?print=pdf.  
36 Ibid.  
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1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Presidential Power Framework 
 
 Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer (1952) is a landmark Supreme Court case that addressed the 
constitutional authority of presidential power. In April of 1952, President Harry Truman issued 
an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce Charles W. Sawyer  to seize and operate 
most steel mills “to avert a nationwide strike of steelworkers.“37 In “seizing” the mills, the order 
also directed the presidents of the mills to operate them as operating managers for the U.S. in 
accordance with U.S. regulations and directions. However, the seizure did not sit well with steel 
owners. In response, steel companies affected by the executive order sued Secretary Sawyer to 
regain control of their mills, demanding declaratory judgment38 and injunctive relief.39  
 In the president’s defense, his lawyers argued, like FDR, that the authority to issue such 
an executive order stemmed from the Vesting Clause of the Constitution,  that “the executive 
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” and upon his constitutional 
prerogatives and duties as President and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces.40 
Truman felt compelled to ensure that the steel demanded during the Korean War was properly 
supplied rather than halted by a strike. The judges did not agree. A District Court issued a 
preliminary injunction which a Court of Appeals of later stayed (i.e. lifted the injunction). 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. appealed the case to the Supreme Court. When the case reached 
the Court, the legal question was whether or not the executive order was constitutional. In a 6-3 
                                                 
37 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
38 “Declaratory judgment is a binding judgment from a court defining the legal relationship 
between parties and their rights in the matter before the court.” See “Injunction” Legal Information 
Institute: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/declaratory_judgment (Also see Fed. R. Civ. P. 27) 
39 “Injunctive relief is a discretionary power in the court in which the court upon deciding the 
plaintiff’s rights are being violated, balances the irreparability of injuries and inadequacy of damages if an 
injunction were not granted against the damages that granting an injunction would cause.” See 
“Declaratory Judgment” Legal Information Institute: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/injunction  
40 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, § 3. 
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decision, the Supreme Court invalidated the executive order to seize the steel mills, holding it 
was neither authorized by the Constitution nor by existing U.S. laws.  
 Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion argued that “presidential powers are not fixed 
but fluctuate, depending upon the disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”41 To 
illustrate this relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches, he created a now 
widely used presidential power framework which divided presidential power into three distinct 
categories. The first zone states that the president is at his height of powers when he “acts 
pursuant to express or implied authorization of Congress.”42 This means that the President acts 
with the consent of Congress under full statutory authority.  
 The second zone is where the president “acts in absence of either congressional grant or 
denial of authority.”43 This zone describes the situation in which the president acts when 
Congress is silent on a particular matter, that is, executive action is “in [the] absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of [executive] authority.”44 It is in these situations where the 
President “must have some basis for independent constitutional power.”45 Justice Jackson, 
however, notes that there also exists a “zone of twilight” where both the president and Congress 
have overlapping or indistinct powers and where a lack of congressional action may necessitate 
executive action.46 Stated differently, Michael J. Turner, author of “Fade to Black: The 
Formalization of Jackson's Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin,” states that the 
“zone of twilight” is “defined by the absence of congressional action, positive or negative, and 
                                                 
41 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Michael J. Turner, “Fade to Black: The Formalization of Jackson's Youngstown Taxonomy by 
Hamdan and Medellin,” American University Law Review 58, No. 3 (February 2009): 675. 
46 Ibid., citing Youngstown, 637. 
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the presence of some constitutional basis for presidential power.”47  Turner emphasizes that the 
“zone of twilight” is narrow, since analysis under this zone “should occur only after an analysis 
under categories one and three is inconclusive.”48  
  In the third and final zone, the president reaches his lowest “ebb” of powers.  This is 
when “the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress” 
but where he can “rely only upon his constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.”49 It is in this zone where inherent powers (i.e. “powers held by the 
President that are not specified in the Constitution, but which are needed to efficiently perform 
the duties of the office”50) matter the most, though often they will not be enough. In fact, Justice 
Jackson rejected President Truman’s argument that his authority for seizing the mills was based 
on the inherent power asserted in the Constitution. Instead, Justice Jackson stated that seizing the 
mills fell into the third zone because the Constitution gives Congress the power “to raise and 
support Armies” and “to provide and maintain a Navy” and thus only “Congress alone controls 
the raising of revenues and their appropriation and may determine in what manner and by what 
means they shall be spent for military and naval procurement.”51 
2. The Unitary Executive Theory  
 
The Unitary Executive Theory, designed to maximize presidential power and minimize 
constitutional restraints on such power, is a product of the reassertion of presidential power in the 
late 20th century. Political scientist Dr. Christopher S. Kelley writes that “the political 
environments of the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, made bargaining and persuading extraordinarily 
                                                 
47 Ibid., 676, citing Youngstown, 638. 
48 Turner, “Fade to Black,” 675. 
49 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
50 See “Inherent Powers” at Legal Dictionary: http://legaldictionary.net/inherent-powers/.  
51 Ibid. 
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difficult for the President.”52 Beginning roughly with the Reagan Administration, in particular, he 
argues, the Executive Branch was staffed with individuals committed to strengthening 
presidential power nonetheless.53  
The Unitary Executive Theory came to fruition during the Reagan Administration in 
response to the political atmosphere of the 60s and 70s, which generated an increasing perception 
of an imperial presidency. The public perceived that the president abused and superseded his 
executive powers, especially in the Nixon years. In response, Reagan officials crafted the unitary 
executive theory as justification for their efforts to establish that a “highly centralized 
bureaucratic structure of government that would ensure that ultimate control of decision making 
in all executive branch agencies, including independent regulatory agencies, would rest in the 
hands of the president or his delegate.”54 In its essence, the Unitary Executive Theory states that 
“any effort to limit executive power is unconstitutional--whether the effort involves the 
imposition of congressional or judicial oversight on executive actions or the creation of so-called 
independent agencies with limited autonomy.”55 This theory is rooted in the Vesting Clause of 
Article II of the Constitution, which vest “the executive power” in the president.  
Proponents of the theory suggest that the both the Vesting Clause and the Take Care 
Clause of Article II of the Constitution create a “hierarchical, unified executive department under 
the direct control of the President.”56 That is, they contend that “the President has plenary or 
                                                 
52 Kelley, Executing the Constitution, 4. 
53 Ibid., 2.  
54 Morton Rosenberg, “Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The 
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive,” 57 George 
Washington Law Review 627 (1989): 628-629, URL. 
55 Karl Manheim and Allan Ides, “The Unitary Executive: Federal courts have almost always 
rebuffed assertions of unchecked power by the executive branch,” Los Angeles Lawyer (September 2006), 
24, http://www.lacba.org/files/lal/vol29no6/2305.pdf. 
56 Steven G. Calabresi and Kevin H. Rhodes, “The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary,” 105 Harvard Law Review 1153 (1992).  
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unlimited power over the execution of administrative functions” such as the power to remove 
officers in the Executive Branch.57 According to political scientist Richard Waterman, “the 
theory posits that, by creating a single president, the founders intended for the president to have 
complete and unfettered control over all aspects of the executive branch” and that any attempt by 
Congress to limit such control is unconstitutional and thus, need not be enforced.58 In short, the 
theory represents expansive claims of inherent presidential power. 
Conversely, opponents of the theory call it a myth that promotes an erroneous 
interpretation of the separation of powers and the very intentions of the Founding Fathers. A 
modern interpretation of the theory suggests “that the authority to enforce federal law and to 
implement federal policy rests exclusively in the executive branch and ultimately in the 
president.”59 Morton Rosenberg, in “Congress’ Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decision-
makers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive,” 
discusses the constitutionally-based theory,  arguing that it “is and always has been a myth 
concocted by the Reagan Administration to provide a semblance of legal respectability for an 
aggressive administrative strategy designed to accomplish what its failed legislative agenda could 
not.”60 The theory “subverts our delicately balanced scheme of separated but shared powers.”61 
He argues that Congress has always had the prerogative over administrative bureaucracy, not the 
president. This includes the power to create, abolish, and locate agencies and to define the 
                                                 
57 Cass R. Sunstein and Lawrence Lessig, “The President and the Administration,” 94 Columbia 
Law Review 1 (1994). 
58 Richard W. Waterman,  “The Administrative Presidency, Unilateral Power, and the Unitary 
Executive Theory,” Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2009): 5-9, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable.23044871.  
59 Ibid., 27. 
60 Rosenberg, “Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers,” 634. 
61 Ibid. 
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powers, duties, tenure, compensation, and other incidents of the offices within them. Thus, there 
is a narrow limit on congressional authority over agencies.  
 
III. History of Executive Actions on Immigration since IRCA 
 Executive actions and orders, as aforementioned, prominent UPDs in the realm of 
immigration, have a long history. For example, Democratic President John F. Kennedy issued an 
executive action directing the then Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to establish a 
formal program to assist Cuban refugees in 1961.62 Democratic President Jimmy Carter in 1980 
issued an executive action admitting Cuban and Haitian refugees into the country, in what came 
to be known as the Mariel boatlift.63 However, executive actions in this particular policy area 
have only relatively recently gained steam.  
 In the last 30 years, U.S. immigration policy has seen a growing trend in curbing illegal 
immigration through attrition, limiting public services and resources to undocumented 
individuals, and increasing sanctions on employers knowingly hiring and recruiting them.64 In 
1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) imposed sanctions on employers who 
knowingly hired or recruited undocumented immigrants.65 In 1996, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) took it a step further and established “the 
Basic Pilot Program,” a program that enabled employers and social services agencies to verify, 
by telephone or electronically, the employment eligibility of immigrants.66 Though these laws 
                                                 
62 Desilver, Executive actions on immigration have long history.  
63 Ibid.  
 64 Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, Thitima Puttitanun and Ana P. Martinez-Donate, “How Do 
Tougher Immigration Measures Affect Unauthorized Immigrants?” Demography Vol. 50, No. 3 (June 
2013):1067. 
 65 Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 1790-Present. (Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 
March, 2013), accessed November 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/timeline-1790. 
66 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 104-208 (1996). 
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both enforced stricter measures to regulate illegal immigration and in the case of IRCA, 
simultaneously provided reprieve from deportation to millions of undocumented immigrants, 
presidents have additionally employed UPDs that, for the most part, have provided relief to 
undocumented immigrants not covered by legislation.67  
 
A.  Ronald Reagan Administration (1986-1989) 
 In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act was signed into law by Republican 
President Ronald Reagan. An advocate of amnesty, the “father of modern conservatism” stated in 
1984: “I believe in the idea of amnesty for those who have put down roots and lived here, even 
though sometime back they may have entered illegally.”68 With a mission to “crackdown” on 
illegal immigration, IRCA established tighter security measures at the U.S.-Mexican border and 
put into place strict penalties to employers who hired undocumented immigrants. But perhaps the 
most striking of the provisions was that the new law granted amnesty, that is “legalized status,” to 
undocumented immigrants who entered the country prior to 1982 and had continuously resided in 
the U.S. since January 1st of that year.69 Specifically, IRCA legalized the status of two particular 
groups of undocumented immigrants. They were: 1) “aliens (i.e. undocumented immigrants) who 
had been unlawfully residing in the United States since before January 1, 1982 (pre-1982 
immigrants),” legalized under § 245A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and 2) 
                                                 
67 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) 
68 “A Reagan Legacy: Amnesty for Illegal Immigrants,” National Public Radio, July 4, 2010, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128303672.  
69 “Legalized status,” unlike “legalized residency” which grants undocumented immigrants 
legalized residency in the U.S. for a definite period of time, is an adjustment of immigration status under 
U.S. immigration law meaning undocumented immigrants’ statuses, under IRCA, were adjusted to Lawful 
Permanent Resident (LPR), which short of citizenship, grants indefinite legal status and work 
authorization including eligibility for public services. LPRs are eligible, after a certain duration of legal 
residency in the U.S., for naturalization.  
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“aliens employed in seasonal agricultural work for a minimum of 90 days in the year prior to 
May, 1986,” legalized under § 210A of the INA.70 The tedious legalization process included 
application fees and demonstration of basic English language proficiency as well as general 
knowledge about U.S. history and government. Notwithstanding such requirements, IRCA was 
successful in legalizing 2.7 million of the roughly 3 million undocumented immigrants who 
applied.71  
 However, since most undocumented immigrants who benefitted from IRCA’s amnesty 
were young, male laborers from Mexico, a new dilemma was created: how to deal with the 
spouses and children of these newly-legalized immigrants who did not qualify for legalization.72 
In response, in October of 1987, President Reagan issued an executive action that shielded from 
deportation minor children of parents legalized by IRCA. This “family fairness” policy, unlike 
IRCA, did not grant an adjustment of legal status to eligible minor children, but rather granted 
them legal residency.73 A report released by Pew Research Center in 2014 states that this policy 
affected an estimated 100,000 families.74 
 
B. George H. W. Bush Administration (1989 – 1993) 
 President George H. W. Bush, following in his predecessor’s mission to keep families 
together, issued an executive action that further extended reprieve from deportation to 
undocumented immigrants who did not qualify for legalization under IRCA. In February of 1990, 
                                                 
70 Nancy Rytina, “IRCA Legalization Effects: Lawful Permanent Residence and Naturalization 
through 2001,” Office of Policy and Planning, Statistics Division, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, October 25, 2002, 2, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/irca0114int.pdf.  
71 Ibid., 3. 
72 Timothy J. Henderson, Beyond Borders: A History of Mexican Migration to the United States 
(Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
73 See Footnote 16. 
74 Major U.S. Immigration Laws, 3. 
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the president issued an executive action which stated that the “spouses and unmarried children of 
people who gained legal status under the 1986 law could apply for permission to remain in the 
country and receive work permits.”75 This policy, which came to be known as the Family 
Fairness Program because it was intended to avoid separating families, affected less than an 
estimated 100,000 families.76 
 Later that same year, Congress passed the Immigration Act of 1990 which also 
incorporated President H. W. Bush’s expanded policy. Among its provisions, the Act adjusted the 
worldwide immigration ceiling from 290,000 to 700,000 and the per-country cap from 20,000 to 
25,620. The Act also granted Salvadoran refugees “Temporary Protected Status” (TPS).77 In 
addition to this policy, President H. W. Bush issued executive actions shielding Central American 
refugees and exiles from deportation. However, illegal immigration continued to grow with 
Mexico remaining “the leading source of both legal and illegal immigrants under the new 
legislation.”78 The number of deportable immigrants reached about 3.5 million by the end of 
1990.79 
 
C.  Bill Clinton Administration (1993-2001) 
                                                 
75 Desilver, Executive actions on immigration have long history. 
76 Ibid.  
77 “Temporary Protected Status” according to the Department of Homeland Security, which issues 
these statuses, is a temporary benefit granted to certain foreign nationals living in the United States due to 
temporary conditions occurring in their country of origin which include: ongoing armed conflict (such as 
civil war), an environmental disaster (such as an earthquake or hurricane, or an epidemic, or other 
extraordinary and temporary conditions. Beneficiaries of this status are protected from removal 
proceedings from the U.S., can obtain an employment authorization document (EAD) and may be granted 
travel authorization. (For more information see: Website of the Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.uscis.gov/tps)  
78 Henderson, Beyond Borders, 116. 
79 Unauthorized Immigrants: Who they are and what the public thinks (Washington, D.C.: Pew 
Research Center, January 15, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/key-data-points/immigration/.  
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 Into the mid 1990s, one of the first executive actions on immigration issued by 
Democratic President Bill Clinton was the extension of former President H. W. Bush’s executive 
action granting TPS status to Salvadoran refugees. In 1997, Congress passed the Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act that legalized the status of migrants from Central 
American countries (i.e. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala).80 By the end of the year, 
President Clinton issued another executive action extending refugee status to thousands of 
Haitian migrants. Congress once again passed legislation which legalized the status of Haitian 
refugees in what came to be known as the Haitian Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act enacted in 
October of 1998. Some 20,000 to 40,000 Haitian refugees, according to the Pew Research Center, 
were shielded from deportation.81  
 In 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).  IIRIRA, taking IRCA a step further in terms of enforcing 
immigration law in the sphere of employment, established “the Basic Pilot Program.” The 
program enabled employers and social services agencies to verify, by telephone or electronically, 
the employment eligibility of prospective immigrant workers.82 Following the implementation of 
the program in five states, it was authorized for use in all 50 states in 2003 and renamed “E-
Verify” in 2007.83 Despite stricter immigration law enforcement, legal and illegal immigration 
continued to grow well into the 2000s, with unauthorized immigration skyrocketing from 5.7 
million in 1995 to 8.6 million by 2000.84 
                                                 
80 Desilver, Executive actions on immigration have long history. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 104-208 (1996). 
83 Benjamin J. Newman, et al., “Immigration Crackdown in the American Workplace: Explaining 
Variation in E-Verify Policy Adoption Across the U.S. States.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly Vol. 12, 
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D.  George W. Bush Administration (2001 – 2009) 
  Although Republican President George W. Bush issued no major executive actions on 
immigration during his two terms, it is nonetheless important to comment on the increasing anti-
immigrant sentiment and heightened concern for national security which took center stage 
beginning in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City 
on September 11th, attitudes toward immigration took a right-wing turn. A study released by the 
Institute for the Study of Labor, entitled “The Effects of 9/11 on Attitudes Toward Immigration 
and the Moderating Role of Education,” suggests “there is strong evidence that anti-Muslim 
sentiments and xenophobic aggression increased considerably among the U.S. population in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.”85 These sentiments were reflected in the legislative bills both 
passed and not passed during the post-9/11 period.  
 In 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Border, Protection, Antiterrorism, 
and Illegal Immigration Control Act, also called the Sensenbrenner bill (H.R. 4437). The Act 
“would have transformed illegal presence in the country from a misdemeanor to a felony, 
threatened anyone giving aid to an undocumented person with up to five years in prison, 
increased the penalty for employing an undocumented worker to $7,500 for a first offense, and 
‘expedited’ the removal of apprehended undocumented immigrants.”86 Although the bill failed to 
pass in the Senate, the Sensenbrenner bill and others of a similar nature would continue to be 
proposed, never voted on (e.g. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 200787) or passed in 
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one chamber, and defeated in the other. By the end of 2007, unauthorized immigration reached an 
unprecedented level at about 12.2 million.88 
 
E.  Barack Obama Administration (2009 – Present) 
1. The DREAM Act, DACA, and the Gang of Eight 
 A year into Democratic President Barack Obama’s first term, the U.S. House of 
Representatives passed the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, or the 
DREAM Act (S. 3992, H.R. 6479), on December 8th, 2010. The DREAM Act was a bipartisan 
piece of legislation that aimed to provide undocumented young men and women brought to the 
U.S. as young children a pathway to citizenship if they graduated from U.S. high schools and 
attended college or performed military service. The Act would have provided legal residence to 
about 1.5 of the 11.3 million undocumented immigrants residing in the country at the time.89 
Since its passing in the Democratically-led House and subsequent defeat in the Senate, the 
DREAM Act has yet to be passed by both chambers of Congress.  
  In addressing the illegal immigration upsurge sans congressional action, on June 5th, 
2012, President Barack Obama issued an executive action creating the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, by which “young adults brought to the U.S. illegally as 
children could apply for temporary deportation relief,” receive legal residency and legal work 
authorization.90 Then Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano issued a 
memorandum, entitled “Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
                                                 
path to citizenship to all undocumented immigrants residing illegally in the country. The bill never came 
to a vote in the House. 
88 Unauthorized Immigrants: Who they are and what the public thinks, (Pew Research Center).  
89 Ibid.  
90 Desilver, Executive actions on immigration have long history. 
 29 
Came to the United States as Children,” which instructed her department heads to give deferred 
action status to undocumented immigrants who came to the U.S. before the age of sixteen; 
continuously resided in the country for at least five years prior to June 15, 2012, and were in the 
U.S. on June 15, 2012; were then attending school, or had graduated from high school, obtained a 
GED, or were honorably discharged from the military; had not been convicted of a felony, 
significant misdemeanor, multiple misdemeanors, or otherwise posed a threat to national security; 
and were not above the age of thirty.”91 Undocumented immigrants under the age of 31 as of June 
15, 2012 and that had been in the U.S. before June 15, 2007 became eligible under the program to 
apply for deferment on renewable two-year cycles. Today, roughly 600,000 of the estimated 1.5 
million eligible have received relief and work permits.92 
 Since President Obama’s DACA program did not guarantee its beneficiaries a path to 
citizenship and nor did it address the remaining (roughly) 10 to 11 million undocumented 
immigrants also residing in the country, a bipartisan coalition of Senators, which came to be 
known as the “Gang of Eight”, came together in 2013 to create legislation to “fix” the 
immigration system. The bipartisan coalition, which was made up of Senators Chuck Schumer 
(D-NY.), Dick Durbin (D-IL), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), John McCain (R-
AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), and Marco Rubio (R-FL), wrote the Border 
Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act (S. 744), also called the 
Gang of Eight amnesty bill. Among its many provisions which included securing the U.S.-
Mexico border, the bill would have created a pathway to citizenship to many undocumented 
                                                 
91 Janet Napolitano, DHS Memorandum to US CBP, USCIS, ICE, Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), 
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immigrants who resided in the U.S. before December 31st of 2011.93 Though the Act passed in 
the Senate by a 68-32 margin, and analysts believed it had the support of a majority of House 
Representatives, Republican Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) did not put it before a vote.  
  2.  DACA Extension and DAPA 
 Calling it an “important step to fix our broken immigration system,” President Barack 
Obama then took immigration matters into his own hands and announced a series of executive 
actions, collectively called the Immigration Accountability Executive Action, on November 20, 
2014.94 Like his predecessors, Republican Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, 
Obama too emphasized keeping families together and reprioritizing enforcement resources. He 
stated, “we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. 
Felons, not families. Criminals, not children. Gang members, not a mother who’s working hard to 
provide for her kids.”95 
 The Immigration Accountability Executive Action, increased law enforcement at the U.S.-
Mexico border and promised to amplify efforts to attract and retain high-skilled labor. At the 
centerpiece of the executive actions was its expansion of the current DACA program and creation 
of the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents, otherwise 
known as, DAPA. The extension of DACA would allow more immigrants that came illegally to 
the U.S. as children to qualify for temporary relief from deportation and work permits. 
Specifically, DACA was extended in three ways: 1) the age cap was removed, allowing otherwise 
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immigration-accountability-executive-action. 
95 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration,” November 
20, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-
immigration.  
 31 
eligible undocumented immigrants who were older than 31 years of age in June 2012 become 
eligible; 2) DACA renewal and work authorization was extended from two to three-years; and 3) 
the eligibility cut-off date by which a DACA applicant must have been in the U.S. was adjusted 
from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010.96 The new DAPA program would grant reprieve from 
deportation to another faction of undocumented immigrants who “have, on [November 20, 2014], 
a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident; have continuously resided 
in the United States since before January 1, 2010; [were] physically present in the United States 
on [November 20, 2014], and at the time of making a request for consideration of deferred action 
with USCIS; have no lawful status on [November 20, 2014]; are not an enforcement priority as 
reflected in the November 20, 2014 “Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of 
Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum;”97 and present no other factors that, in the exercise of 
discretion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”98 
 In February 2015, twenty-six states brought suit challenging the president’s use of 
executive power in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas in Texas v. 
United States. The Court blocked DACA/DAPA on procedural grounds through a preliminary 
injunction, which was upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on November 9, 2015. Until 
the Supreme Court hears the case in April of 2016, the preliminary injunction will remain in 
effect. 
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IV.  Constitutional Analysis of DACA/DAPA 
A.  Constitutionality Debate 
 President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on immigration have been met with statutory 
and constitutional challenges. While the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas v. United States 
upheld the District Court’s ruling striking down the executive actions, the questions surrounding 
their legality are yet to be resolved. The five main legal concerns are: 1) APA violations, 2) 
existing precedent, 3) The Take Care Clause of Article II, 4) prosecutorial discretion, and 5) the 
separation of powers doctrine.  
1. APA Violations 
In Texas v. United States, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas struck 
down the executive actions because of a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 
Under the APA, administrative agencies in the federal government are required to publish a 
“general notice of proposed rule making” in the Federal Register and allow for “interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, 
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”99 Judge Hanen, who 
wrote the District Court opinion, found that the federal government violated  the APA by failing 
to comply with the “notice-and-comment” rulemaking requirement upon promulgation of the 
programs.100 The U.S. government continues to hold that the actions are unreviewable under the 
APA.  
To clarify what is and is not reviewable under the APA, prior to becoming Supreme Court 
Justice, Elena Kagan, in an article written in the Harvard Law Review entitled “Presidential 
Administration,” makes this important distinction. She cites Franklin v. Massachusetts (1992) 
                                                 
99 The Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S. Code § 553. 
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where the Supreme Court held that the President is not an ‘agency’ as defined by the APA and 
thus, his actions are not subject to APA regulations.101 A president’s actions are subject to 
judicial review, however, if the action(s) in question are delegated to an agency head but directed 
by the President. Only then has the President effectively “stepped into the shoes of an agency 
head and the review provisions usually applicable to that agency’s actions should govern.”102 The 
District Court employed this rationale.  
2. Precedent 
 In defending the constitutionality of President Obama’s 2014 executive actions, the 
Obama Administration has consistently made the case that precedent is on its side. Often citing 
executive actions on immigration promulgated by President Reagan and H.W. Bush, the 
Administration has also claimed that it is not disregarding the law anymore than its predecessors. 
According to a report released by the American Immigration Council, since 1956, U.S. presidents 
have granted temporary immigration relief to undocumented immigrants a total of 39 times.103 A 
SCOTUS blog written by Brianne Gorod, Chief Counsel at the Constitutional Accountability 
Center, states that “by setting [enforcement] priorities and providing guidance regarding how 
those priorities should be implemented, the Obama administration was simply doing what 
presidents of both parties have done for decades – exercising the substantial discretion Congress 
                                                 
101 The APA defines ‘agency’ as “each authority of the Government of the United States, whether 
or not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not include—(A) Congress; (B) the 
courts of the United States; (C) the government of the territories or possessions of the United States; (D) 
the government of the District of Columbia; or except as to the requirements of § 552 of this title--(E) 
agencies composed of representatives of the parties or of representatives of organizations of the parties to 
the disputes determined by them; (F) courts martial and military commissions; (G) military authority 
exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory…” 5 U.S. Code § 551. 
102 Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” 114 Harvard Law Review 2245 (2000-2001): 2351, 
http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol114_kagan.pdf.  
103 Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956 – Present (Washington D.C.: 
American Immigration Council, October 2014), accessed October 2015, 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/executive_grants_of_temporary_immigration_r
elief_1956-present_final.pdf.  
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has conferred on the executive branch to make determinations about how best to enforce the 
nation’s immigration laws.”104 
 Republican Senator and 2016 presidential candidate Ted Cruz (R-FL), among other 
critics, rejects the notion that the Obama Administration is not disregarding the law any more 
than previous presidential administrations. His Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy article, 
published in January of 2015, accuses the Obama Administration of “unprecedented lawlessness” 
in a variety of policy areas including immigration. He argues that there is “no historical basis for 
this sweeping view of executive power.”105 To support this claim, Cruz cites instances in which 
previous administrations acceptably disregarded federal laws due to either legitimate 
constitutional objections to a federal law or statutes (e.g. President George W. Bush’s signing 
statements106) or the president was faced with extenuating circumstances such as war (e.g. 
presidents that did not comply with the War Powers resolution, which forbids the president from 
continuing military operations beyond 60 days without express congressional approval). In his 
view, President Obama’s executive actions were not promulgated in response to a legitimate 
constitutional objection and nor were they a product of extenuating circumstances. He thus has no 
prerogative nor constitutional right to categorically ignore statues. Jessica Schulberg, in her 
University of Arizona Law Review article, “President Obama’s DAPA Executive Action: 
Ephemeral or Enduring,” finds that the response, rather than the executive actions themselves, is 
unprecedented. She cites that historically, no executive actions (also granting reprieve from 
                                                 
104 Brianne Gorod, “Symposium: Why it’s time to unfreeze DAPA,” SCOTUSblog, February 9, 
2016, http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/02/symposium-why-its-time-to-unfreeze-dapa/.  
105 Ted Cruz, “The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness,” Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy Vol. 38, No. 1 (2015), URL. 
106 The practice of signing statements—essentially commentary on a new law—according to Mr. 
Cruz, is “used to register constitutional objection to infringements on executive authority protects the 
Constitution’s core framework.” These were used frequently under the George W. Bush Administration to 
express constitutional objects and the Executive’s intent to refuse enforcement.   
 35 
deportation to certain undocumented immigrants) in the 80s and 90s were met with such a high 
level of scrutiny, intense claims of presidential overreach, threats of impeachment, lawsuits, or 
government shutdowns.107 
3. The Take Care Clause 
 Also a part of the current constitutionality debate of President Obama’s 2014 executive 
actions is whether or not the president violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the 
Constitution. To recall, the Take Care Clause states that the president of the United States “shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”108 The Obama Administration claims it has not 
violated this clause. A memorandum opinion released by the Office of Legal Counsel on the day 
the executive actions were announced argues that the Department of Homeland Security’s 
discretion over enforcement is consistent with the President’s constitutional “duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed.” The opinion states that “when Congress vests enforcement 
authority in an executive agency, that agency has the discretion to decide whether a particular 
violation of the law warrants prosecution or other enforcement action.”109 The opinion cites 
Heckler v. Chaney (1985) where the Court recognized that “faithful” execution of the law does 
not necessarily entail “act[ing] against each technical violation of the statute” that an agency is 
charged with enforcing, but rather, it implores the agency to “balanc[e]…a number of factors 
[e.g. allocation of resources, compatibility with other existing overall agency policies] which are 
                                                 
107 Jessica A. Schulberg, “President Obama’s DAPA Executive Action: Ephemeral or Enduring,” 
57 University of Arizona Law Review 623 (2015), URL. 
108 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, § 3. 
109 Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum Opinion for the Secretary of Homeland Security and the 
Counsel to the President, The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of 
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others (November 19, 
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peculiarly within its expertise.”110 This precedent, OLC argues, has thus granted the President, 
through the Department of Homeland Security, broad discretion in this area. Nonetheless, OLC is 
careful to note that such broad discretion does not go without limits, limits that it admits are not 
“clearly defined.”111 
 Similarly, Senator Cruz argues that in taking care that the laws be faithfully executed, the 
president is obligated to enforce the laws enacted by Congress rather than “pick and choose” 
which laws to enforce based on personal or political preferences.112 That is, the Take Care Clause 
is a requirement, not a prerogative. Like other scholars, Cruz cites Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer stating, “the President exceeds the Take Care Clause duty once he stops adhering to 
federal law.”113 In his view, by not enforcing immigration law on certain undocumented 
immigrants, the president is not enforcing the law all together. Cruz also argues that such 
disregard for domestic policy statutes essentially “usurps” congressional legislative power and 
“sets dangerous precedents” that allow future presidents to disregard the Take Care Clause. The 
plaintiffs (twenty-six states including Texas) in Texas v. United States certainly agree, claiming 
Obama’s executive actions are unconstitutional because they abdicate the role of the Executive. 
The actions, in their view, run afoul of the president’s duty to “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed.” 
4. Prosecutorial Discretion 
 Perhaps at the core of the constitutionality debate is whether or not President Obama’s 
2014 executive actions fall under the executive power of prosecutorial discretion. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context as “[a] federal authority’s 
                                                 
110 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
111 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority, 5. 
112 Cruz, “The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness.” 
113 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153 (1952). 
 37 
discretion not to immediately arrest or endeavor to remove an illegal immigrant because the 
immigrant does not meet the federal government’s immigration-enforcement priorities.”114 
 In a memorandum issued to immigration agencies, “Policies for the Apprehension, 
Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants,” DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson states that 
prosecutorial discretion, in the context of immigration, applies to a broad range of discretionary 
enforcement decisions, including: “whether to issue, serve, file, or cancel a Notice to Appear; 
whom to stop, question, and arrest; whom to detain, and arrest; whom to detain or release; 
whether to detain or release; whether to settle, dismiss, appeal, or join in a motion on a case; and 
whether to grant deferred action, parole, or a stay of removal instead of pursuing removal in a 
case.”115 A Congressional Digest publication entitled, “Legality of Obama’s Immigration 
Initiatives: Executive Branch Authority Over Immigration Enforcement,” also states that 
prosecutorial discretion “is generally seen as affording the Executive wide latitude in determining 
when, against whom, how, and even whether to prosecute apparent violations of Federal law.”116 
Since this discretionary power does not require express delegation from Congress, the Executive 
has claimed substantial discretionary authority in this area, particularly in immigration law. This 
form of discretion has been exercised by DHS and its predecessor, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS), for quite some time, instructing immigration officers to prioritize 
and deprioritize the enforcement of immigration laws against certain groups of undocumented 
immigrants. 
                                                 
114 See Black’s Law Dictionary 565 (10th ed. 2014). 
115 Jeh Johnson, Memorandum to US ICE, CBP, USCIS, and Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy, 
Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (November, 20, 
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 In the context of President Obama’s most recent actions on immigration, the Executive 
claims constitutional authority to promulgate extended DACA and DAPA by classifying them as 
under the scope of prosecutorial discretion with respect to undocumented immigrants who came 
to the U.S. as children and to certain parents of U.S. Citizens or Lawful Permanent Residents. In 
a memorandum issued to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) a day after 
President Obama’s announcement, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson directed the agencies to prioritize 
the enforcement of immigration law to “threats to national security, public safety, and border 
security,” meaning, prioritize the removal of undocumented immigrants engaged in criminal 
activity, that pose a threat to public safety, or that have recently entered the country, and thus, 
deprioritize undocumented immigrants not in those categories.117 (This is a similar enforcement 
discretionary policy to that of former DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, entitled “Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, 
“issued following the creation of DACA in 2012.118)  
 The Office of Legal Counsel, in “The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to 
Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer 
Removal of Others,” defends deferred action as “an exercise rooted in DHS’s authority to enforce 
the immigration laws.”119 It identifies respects in which deferred action is different, and 
nevertheless permissible, from other types of widespread exercises of enforcement discretion. For 
example, that it is “a decision to openly tolerate an undocumented alien’s continued presence in 
                                                 
117 Jeh Johnson, Memorandum to US ICE, CBP, USCIS, and Acting Assistant Secretary for Policy, 
Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants (November 20, 
2014), URL. 
118 Johnson, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion. 
119 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority, 20. 
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the United States for a fixed period (subject to revocation at the agency’s discretion)” and that it 
carries with it benefits apart from non-enforcement like employment authorization and 
suspension of unlawful presence.120 As a form of prosecutorial discretion, OLC argues that 
deferred action does not confer lawful immigration status and nor does it provide a path to lawful 
permanent residence or citizenship. It is revocable at any time at the discretion of DHS. OLC also 
notes that the lack of resources to remove all purported eleven million undocumented immigrants 
presently in the country is a factor that is considered in executing such a discretion. They argue 
that deferment, as a practical matter considering this “severe resource constraint,” does not 
represent an abdication of DHS’s responsibilities. 
 Critics disagree. They argue that the President, acting through DHS, does not possess a 
discretionary power so “wide” and “broad” as to promulgate expanded DACA and DAPA. 
Opponents argue that President Obama’s executive actions do not constitute prosecutorial 
discretion to begin with, due to the lack of case-by-case evaluation. For example, Josh Blackman 
states that, “DAPA neither employs an individualized, case-by-case analysis, nor is consonant 
with long-standing congressional policy.”121 Schulberg similarly concedes in arguments made 
against the executive actions in U.S. v. Juarez-Escobar (2014), that the creation of expanded 
DACA and DAPA are unconstitutional as they “eclipsed prosecutorial discretion and constructed 
an inflexible framework for considering deferred action applications.”122 In sum, critics of the 
executive actions insist that the Executive cannot employ the very essence of prosecutorial 
discretion’s case-by-case discretion over the removal of a substantially large class of 
undocumented immigrants, thus rendering both DACA and DAPA unconstitutional. 
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5. Separation of Powers 
 President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on immigration raise serious concerns 
regarding the separation of powers. The separation of powers doctrine, as defined by the Wex 
Legal Dictionary, is “the political doctrine of constitutional law under which the three branches 
of government (Executive, Legislative, and Judicial) are kept separate to prevent abuse of power, 
also know as the system of checks and balances.”123 In the immigration context, which branch of 
government, whether the Executive or the Legislative, has the power to create the type of 
immigration-related programs Obama has proposed, is disputed. In promulgating the DACA and 
DAPA programs, the Obama Administration argues it is lawfully exercising its executive powers 
in an area over which it contends it has “broad discretion.” 
 First, the Obama Administration has asserted that the DACA and DAPA programs do not 
in and of themselves provide deferred action individuals with the types of benefits that only the 
Legislative Branch can offer through a change in immigration law. These benefits include legal 
immigration status and the eligibility for certain public benefits from which they are otherwise 
statutorily barred (i.e. the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 
1996124). As OLC has emphasized, deferred action grants eligible immigrants reprieve from 
deportation, that is, the permission to reside lawfully in the U.S. for a specified period of time. 
President Obama echoed this distinction in his announcement, stating, “[the programs do] not 
grant [eligible undocumented immigrants] citizenship, or the right to stay here permanently, or 
                                                 
123 “Separation of Powers,” Wex Legal Dictionary, Cornell Legal Information Institute, 
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124 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
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offer the same benefits that citizens receive – only Congress can do that. All we’re saying is 
we’re not going to deport you.”125 In addition, a Congressional Digest piece discussing the 
legality of the executive actions, addresses another important instance in which the Executive has 
discretion over the Legislative in immigration matters: the issuing of employment authorization 
documents (EADs) to deferred action individuals. In granting EADs, the immigration agencies 
rely on the definition of “unauthorized alien” in the INA.126 The INA’s definition of 
“unauthorized alien” has “historically been interpreted as giving the Executive [not the 
Legislative] the authority to grant employment authorization documents to aliens who are not 
expressly authorized to work in the U.S. but upon showing “an economic necessity for 
employment.”127 It is clear that the administration contends that in providing deferred action 
status to certain undocumented immigrants it is not breaching the bounds of its executive powers. 
 On the other hand, critics of the Obama Administration in this respect argue that the 
president’s executive actions are not only policy-making, essentially usurping the role of the 
Legislative Branch, but that they also run afoul of legislative intent. Many cite the fact that 
Congress rejected “at least ten times since 2001” the Development, Relief, and Education for 
Alien Minors (DREAM) Act which in effect would have provided a path to citizenship to 
undocumented youth 15 years and younger.128  
                                                 
125 Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration.” 
126 “Unauthorized alien” in the terminology used in the INA to describe an undocumented 
immigrant. 
127 Immigration and Nationality Act § 274A (h)(3). 
128 The DREAM Act was a failed immigration reform bill last introduced on May 11, 2011 in the 
Senate (S. 952) by Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) and 32 fellow senators, and in the House of 
Representatives (H.R. 1842) by Representatives Howard Berman (D-CA), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), 
and Lucille Roybal-Allard. It would have enacted two changes to immigration law: “1) It would permit 
certain immigrant students who have grown up in the U.S. to apply for temporary legal status and to 
eventually obtain permanent legal status and become eligible for U.S. citizenship if they go to college or 
serve in the U.S. military; and 2) It would eliminate a federal provision that penalizes states that provide 
in-state tuition without regard to immigration status.” See “Dream Act Summary” by National 
Immigration Law Center (NILC): https://nilc.org/dreamsummary.html.  
 42 
 
B.  Judicial challenges to DACA/DAPA 
 Following President Obama’s announcement in November 2014 creating extended DACA 
and DAPA, three judicial challenges subsequently ensued. The first was U.S. v. Juarez-Escobar, 
the second, Arpaio v. Obama, and the third and active case, Texas v. United States. These three 
judicial challenges, amid ongoing political debate, reveal core constitutional issues of both the 
president’s power to promulgate such programs and the legality of the programs themselves.  
1.  U.S. v. Juarez-Escobar  
 
 A memorandum opinion filed by Judge Arthur Schwab in U.S. v. Elionardo Juarez-
Escobar in  the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on December 16, 
2014 was the first judicial challenge to President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on immigration 
that specifically addressed their constitutionality.129 The opinion, entitled, “Memorandum 
Opinion and Order of Court Re: Applicability of President Obama’s November 20, 2014 
Executive Action on Immigration to this Defendant,” addressed the applicability of expanded 
DACA and DAPA to Elionardo Juarez-Escobar, an undocumented immigrant who had pled 
guilty to reentry (in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, which issues criminal penalties for reentry of 
removed aliens) and who, at the time, was awaiting sentencing.130 The court, concerned that the 
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look for immigration law violating, leaving that to the federal government,” a federal indictment or 
deportation proceedings were not inevitable.130 The issue is that had the Defendant been arrested in a 
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executive actions could have had an impact on the Defendant’s sentencing, requested counsel for 
the Government and for the Defendant to brief: I) on whether or not the actions applied to the 
Defendant and why, and II) if there were any constitutional and/or statutory considerations that 
the Court would need to address to the Defendant (and if so, what and how the Court should 
resolve the issues).131  
 On the request for briefing on the constitutionality of the actions, Judge Schwab argued 
that the executive actions creating DACA and DAPA raise concerns about the separation of 
powers between the Executive and Legislative branches of government and thus warrant judicial 
review “to ensure that executive power is governed by and answerable to the law such that ‘the 
sword that execute the law is in it, and not above it.’”132 The opinion states that the authority for 
executive actions and orders issued by the president must be based upon (1) the Constitution; (2) 
statutes or treaties; or (3) the president’s inherent authority to ensure that the laws are “faithfully 
executed.” Schwab also notes that President Obama has historically stated that executive actions 
and orders on immigration would exceed his executive authority. For example, he cites Obama 
stating, “Believe me, the idea of doing things on my own is tempting. I promise you. Not just on 
immigration reform. But that’s not how our system works. That’s not how our democracy 
functions. That’s not how our Constitution is written.”133 Though not dispositive of the 
constitutionality of the actions, such statements troubled the court. For these reasons, the court 
found it imperative to examine whether the President had the authority to issue his executive 
actions on immigration to determine whether they would “unjustly and unequally” impact the 
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Defendant “in light of the [] Court’s obligation to avoid sentencing disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”134 
 In its opinion, the court decided that the executive actions are unconstitutional because 
they violate the separation of powers doctrine and the Take Care Clause. First, the court argued, 
inaction by Congress to act on the issue of immigration does not render otherwise 
unconstitutional executive actions constitutional. Schwab argued that the executive actions “cross 
the line,” constitute “legislation,” and effectively change U.S. immigration policy. The president 
may only ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed…”; he may not take any Executive 
Action that creates laws.”135 Second, the court found that the executive actions exceed  
prosecutorial discretion and are rather, legislation. Judge Schwab argued that the executive 
actions: “(a) provide for a systematic and rigid process by which a broad group of individuals 
will be treated differently than others based upon arbitrary classifications, rather than case-by-
case examination; and (b) [the executive policy] allows undocumented immigrants, who fall 
within these broad categories, to obtain substantive rights [e.g. work authorization 
documentation].”136  
 The court and the Defendant’s counsel decided that should the actions be constitutional, 
the deportation and removal priorities would not apply to the Defendant and thus he would not be 
in “deportation mode” before the court. The government’s brief stated that even if the Defendant 
is not a priority for deportation, the executive actions are not applicable to him because the 
executive actions do not apply to individuals in criminal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). 
However, the Defendant’s counsel argued that Juarez-Escobar’s familial relationship, which 
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included the possibility that he may be a parent or step-parent to a U.S. Citizen or Lawful 
Permanent Resident, “would bolster his non-deportation and/or deferred action request.”137  
 Though the memorandum opinion in U.S. v. Juarez-Escobar, is not binding, it raises some 
interesting implications of the executive actions, specifically in regards to their applicability to 
undocumented individuals in criminal proceedings.   
2.  Arpaio v. Obama Case Dismissal 
 
 Arpaio v. Obama was the first of two court cases that sued the federal government over 
the legality of President Obama’s executive actions. The case was filled in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia by Plaintiff Joe Arpaio, the notorious Sheriff of Maricopa County in 
Arizona who rose to recent fame, in part, for vehemently and publicly opposing illegal 
immigration.138 Arpaio filled the lawsuit on November 20, 2014, against President Obama, the 
Secretary of DHS, the Director of USCIS, and the U.S. Attorney General, under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act and the APA. Arpaio claimed that the two federal programs promulgated by 
President Obama, DACA and DAPA, constituted unconstitutional abuses of presidential power. 
Specifically, Arpaio argued that the programs violated the APA for failure to go through a 
“notice-and-comment” period as required by the Act, the president’s constitutional duty to “take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” and the non-delegation doctrine.139 On December 4, 
2014, he sought a preliminary injunction on the actions. However, Judge Howell, writing for the 
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Court, found that the Plaintiff did not suffer a legally cognizable injury and thus held that he had 
no standing to sue. The Court explained that Sheriff Arpaio did not suffer any injury as a result of 
the programs.  His assertion of general grievances against federal immigration policy and alleged 
injuries were speculative, and he failed to show how the programs specifically authorized the 
conduct of which he complained.140 Accordingly, Judge Howell denied the preliminary injunction 
and dismissed the case.141  
 On December 29, 2014, Sheriff Arpaio appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which unanimously affirmed the lower court judgment on August 14, 2015. Judge Nina Pillard, 
who wrote the opinion of the court, stated that in regard to the claims that Arpaio brought to the 
court, alleging that President Obama’s executive actions on immigration are “unconstitutional, 
arbitrary, capricious, and invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act,” the court could not 
resolve the claims unless he had Article III standing to raise them.142 To have Article III standing, 
a plaintiff must “have suffered or be about to suffer a concrete injury fairly traceable to the 
policies he challenges and redressable by the relief he seeks.”143 Arpaio argued that the programs 
would incite more crimes and harm him as a sheriff because the increased crime would force him 
to spend more money policing the county and running its jails. He alleged that I) the deferred 
action would act as a magnet to draw more undocumented immigrants to cross the border from 
Mexico and into Maricopa County where they would commit crimes, and II) the programs would 
decrease total deportations which would cause more individuals to remain unlawfully in 
Maricopa and commit crimes than would be the case without deferred action.144 The court 
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concluded that Sheriff Arpaio “failed to allege an injury that is both fairly traceable to the 
deferred action policies and redressable by enjoining them, as our standing precedents 
require.”145 Judge Pillard, as did the lower District Court judge, found his claims of increased 
crime “rested on chains of supposition and contradicted acknowledged realities.”146 For this 
reason, it was ordered that Sheriff Arpaio lacked standing to challenge DACA and DAPA. 
3. Texas v. United States 
 
 The fate of President Obama’s DACA and DAPA programs may very well be decided in 
Texas v. United States, which first entered the court system in early 2015. The case highlights 
both constitutional and legal implications of Obama’s executive actions. 
a) District Court Ruling 
 
 Texas v. United States, at the District Court level, was decided in the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas Brownsville Division on Feb 16, 2015.147 The plaintiffs of the 
case were twenty-six states and individuals that brought suit against the Defendants, the United 
States and several DHS officials, including Secretary Jeh Johnson.148 The Plaintiffs sought 
injunctive relief which would stop the Obama Administration from implementing extended 
DACA and DAPA.149 The question before the court was: “Do the laws of the United States, 
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including the Constitution, give the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to take the action 
at issue in this case?”150 The Plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary’s actions (i.e. “establishing a 
new program [DAPA] utilizing deferred action to stay deportation proceedings and award certain 
benefits to approximately four to five million individuals residing illegally in the United States” 
and from here on out referred to as “DHS Directive”), violated the Take Care Clause of the 
Constitution and the APA. The Defendants, on the other hand, asserted two main arguments: “(1) 
[that] the States lack[ed] standing to bring th[e] suit; and (2) [that] the States’ claims [were] not 
meritorious.”151 Judge Andrew S. Hanen, who wrote on the behalf of court, addressed three 
issues concerning President Obama’s executive actions: standing, legality, and constitutionality. 
i. Standing 
 On the issue of standing, the court sought to determine whether or not the Plaintiffs had 
standing to sue the U.S. Government. It assessed primarily two types of standing: Article III 
standing and prudential standing, both of which the court determined the Plaintiffs successfully 
met.152 Among other forms of standing, the court also confirmed that the Plaintiffs satisfied the 
standing requirements prescribed by the APA. The court found that the Plaintiffs met all three 
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prongs of Article III standing which require the burden of proving injury, causation, and 
redressability.  
 To prove injury, the Plaintiffs alleged that the DHS Directive, upon enforcement, will 
cause significant economic injury to their fiscal interests. Texas, for example, argued that the 
directive will create a new class of individuals eligible to apply for driver’s licenses that would in 
turn impose “substantial costs” on the state’s budget for processing. In addition, the states also 
argued that even prior to applying for driver’s licenses these undocumented immigrants, as a 
result of the REAL ID Act of 2005, which “require[s] states to determine the immigration status 
of applicants prior to issuing a driver’s license or an identification card,” will be required to 
submit queries to the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program and 
thus the states will be required to pay a fee for each applicant processed.153 The Defendants, 
however, argued that these costs are “self-inflicted” as the directive does not require states to 
provide any state benefits to deferred action recipients and because states can adjust their benefit 
programs to avoid incurring them.154 The court found that the directive would nonetheless affect 
state programs and that the federal government would compel compliance by all states regarding 
the  issuance of driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients, as it ruled in Arizona Dream Act 
Coalition v. Brewer (2014).155 The states could not avoid these costs as Arizona made clear, since 
any move by a plaintiff state to limit the issuance of driver’s licenses would be viewed as illegal 
for violating the Equal Protection Clause. It would invoke unequal treatment of similarly-situated 
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individuals (i.e. non-citizens) who would otherwise be permitted to use employment 
authorization documents (EADs) to obtain driver’s licenses. Thus, the DHS Directive, the court 
argued, “will directly injure the proprietary interests of the driver’s license programs and costs 
the states badly needed funds.”156 
 To prove the second prong, causation, the Plaintiff must show that the alleged injury is 
not merely “remote and indirect: but is instead fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant.”157 
The court determined that the Plaintiffs plead an injury sufficient to demonstrate standing since, 
at least in the issuing of driver’s licenses, the DHS Directive would involve “fees mandated by 
federal law that are required to be paid by states directly to the federal government – damages 
that are a virtual certainty.”158 In addition, the Plaintiffs, primarily the state of Texas, met their 
burden of showing that their alleged injuries have been and will be directly “traceable” to the 
actions of the Defendants (i.e. the programs are the cause of the costs). Finally, the court also 
found sufficient the Plaintiffs’ redressability argument which must examine whether the remedy a 
plaintiff seeks (in this case, injunctive relief) will redress or prevent the alleged injury. Judge 
Hanen stated that injunctive relief would “undoubtedly prevent the harm [the Plaintiffs] allege 
will stem from Defendants’ DHS Directive.”159 
 Aside from Article III standing, the court also found that the Plaintiffs met the burden of 
proof required for prudential standing. The court found that the Plaintiffs pled a “generalized 
grievance” in showing that the DHS Directive, specifically DAPA, would directly injure their 
proprietary interests by creating a new class of individuals eligible to apply for driver’s licenses 
which would, in turn, cause states to incur significant costs to process applications and issue the 
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licenses. An important part of proving prudential standing is showing that “the interest sought to 
be protected by the complainant [is] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute…in question.” This too, the court found the Plaintiffs proved. Judge 
Hanen confirmed that the Plaintiffs’ claims came within the “zone of interest” to be protected by 
immigration statutes, mainly that “the fact that DAPA undermines the INA statues enacted to 
protect states puts the plaintiffs squarely within the zone of interest of the immigration statues at 
issue.” 160 This the court found sufficient to prove prudential standing.161 
ii. Legality  
 The second issue that the court addressed was the legality of the DHS Directive. The court 
affirmed that “Secretary Johnson’s decisions as to how to marshal Department of Homeland 
Security resources, how to best utilize DHS manpower, and where to concentrate its activities are 
discretionary decisions solely within the purview of the Executive Branch, to the extent that they 
do not violate any statute or the Constitution.”162 The Plaintiffs argued that DAPA does violate 
the Constitution since it lies outside of the Executive’s powers because it is legislating.  
Specifically, they argued, “the doctrine of separation of powers likewise precludes the Executive 
Branch from undoing this careful balance (“careful balance struck by Congress with respect to 
unauthorized employment”) by granting legal presence together with related benefits to over four 
million individuals who are illegally in the country.”163 In addition, the Plaintiffs also argued that 
DHS failed to comply with procedural statutory requirements as mandated by the APA.164  
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 Prior to assessing the validity of their claims, the court assessed the elements necessary to 
grant injunctive relief to the Plaintiffs. To be eligible for injunctive relief, the Plaintiff must 
establish four elements: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial 
threat that the [states] will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that the 
threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause [Defendants]; and (4) 
that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.”165  
 To establish the first element, the Plaintiffs argued that the implementation of DAPA 
violates the APA because it constitutes “substantive” and “legislative” rule-making promulgated 
without the requisite notice-and-comment process as obligatory under § 553 of the Act. The 
Defendants, on the other hand, argued that DAPA is not subject to judicial review under the APA 
and even if it were, it is exempt from the APA’s procedural requirements. The court rebutted the 
Defendants’ unreviewability claim citing Heckler v. Chaney (1985), where the Supreme Court 
stated that an agency’s decision to “consciously and expressly adopt [] a general policy that is so 
extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities” would not warrant the 
presumption of unreviewability.166 The court sided with the Plaintiffs in determining that the 
DHS Directive is a rule, and thus subject to APA requirements, because of its binding and 
legislative nature that “supplements a state, adopts a new position inconsistent with existing 
regulations, or otherwise effects a substantive change in existing law or policy.”167  
 The court also found that the Plaintiffs established the remaining three elements by 
proving that the DHS Directive would cause the States “irreparable harm” of the economic kind 
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upon implementation. The Plaintiffs cited the economic harm that states incurred when DACA 
was passed in 2012, which spiked driver’s license costs in states like Texas. To establish the third 
and fourth prong, which require a balance of hardship to the parties and that the injunction not 
disserve public interest, the Plaintiffs are required to show that they would suffer more harm 
without the injunction than would the Defendants if it were granted.168 The Plaintiffs argued that 
an injunction against the Directive would keep the status quo and not be “excessively 
burdensome” on the Defendants, who would continue to prosecute or not prosecute illegally-
present individuals as current laws dictate. The court agreed and also found that “the public 
interest factor that weighs the heaviest is ensuring the actions of the executive comply with this 
country’s laws and its Constitution.”169  
iii. Constitutionality 
 On the issue of the constitutionality of the DHS Directive, the court found that for the 
Plaintiffs to receive the requested injunctive relief, they needed only to assess the likelihood of 
the success of one of its claims. In determining that the DHS Directive violated the APA, the 
court declined to address the constitutionality question. The Federal District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas thus blocked President Obama’s executive actions on procedural 
grounds under the APA. 
b) Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling 
 
 Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Justice appealed the lower court’s decision to the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. They asked the court for an emergency stay (i.e. stop the 
injunction from being in effect) to allow the programs to proceed implementation. However, the 
                                                 
168 Ibid., 118. 
169 Ibid., 121. 
 54 
motion for an emergency stay was denied in a 2-1 decision on May 26, 2015.170 Nearly six 
months later, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the District Court’s order granting 
the preliminary injunction on November 9, 2015.171 The majority of the court, Circuit Judges 
Jerry E. Smith and Jennifer Walker Elrod, affirmed the lower court’s three conclusions: I) that 
Texas had legal standing to sue based on the injury it, and other states, would incur in issuing 
driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients; II) that the case is justiciable and reviewable under 
the APA; and III) that the states had established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits 
of their procedural and substantive APA claims.172 The court also concluded that the DAPA 
Memorandum is not only not authorized by statute but it also is a substantive violation of the 
APA because the federal government did not have the authority to promulgate them under the 
INA. 
c) Supreme Court  
 
 On November 20, 2015, exactly a year after the programs were announced, the 
Department of Justice filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.173 On January 19, 2016 the petition 
was granted. In addition to the questions presented by the petition which asked “(1) whether a 
state that voluntarily provides a subsidy to all aliens with deferred action has Article III standing 
and justiciable cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to challenge the 
Secretary of Homeland Security’s guidance seeking to establish a process for considering 
deferred action for certain aliens because it will lead to more aliens having deferred action; (2) 
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whether the guidance is arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law; and (3) 
whether the guidance was subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures,” the Supreme 
Court also directed the parties to brief and argue the following question: “Whether the guidance 
violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3.”174 The Court will hear 
arguments on April 18, 2016 and is expected to make a decision before the term ends in June 
2016.175 
 
C. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Presidential Power Framework Revisited  
1. Applicability to Modern Government  
 Regarded by Constitutional law scholar Julian G. Ku as “ha[ving] become a canonical 
statement about the nature of U.S. presidential powers,” Justice Jackson’s presidential power 
framework created in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer gives scholars (and perhaps the 
Supreme Court) a unique opportunity to analyze President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on 
immigration.176 However, this is no easy feat. Bianca Figueroa-Santana, writing for the Columbia 
Law Review, states that “scholars have struggled to locate President Obama’s executive policies 
within the traditional tripartite framework of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer” mainly 
because scholars employing the framework have announced wildly different results.177 
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 Lauren Gilbert, author of “Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the 
Absence of Immigration Reform” published in the West Virginia Law Review, categorizes 
DACA, created via executive order in 2012, within Justice Jackson’s second zone. Zone 2 
includes a “zone of twilight,” which allows the president to act in cases of “congressional inertia, 
indifferences or quiescence.”178 Gilbert argues that the promulgation of DACA falls within this 
zone because the Executive Branch acted in the face of congressional gridlock and inertia, and 
soon after, rather than taking steps to undo the action, Congress immediately began to discuss the 
contours of comprehensive immigration reform.179 By sharp contrast, Associate Professor of Law 
at the South Texas College of Law, Josh Blackman in his law review article “The 
Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law” categorizes Obama’s most 
recent deferred action programs, including DACA, within the third zone. In Zone 3, the 
president’s acts are deemed unconstitutional when Congress explicitly or implicitly forbids the 
president from acting in a particular way. Blackman argues that Congress expressly denied the 
president the authority to grant reprieve to undocumented immigrants because it failed to pass 
immigration reform, did not and has not “acquiesced in a pattern of analogous executive actions,” 
and even sought to defund DAPA (but did not).180 
 However, aside from the fact that employing Jackson’s framework on President Obama’s 
immigration action results in polarizing and conflicting conclusions, there are two fundamental 
reasons that explain why this framework is not the best metric for categorizing not only today’s 
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presidential actions but specifically those that lie within the scope of immigration policy. The 
first reason is the framework is antiquated. If in 1952 Justice Jackson called the framework “a 
somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations,” today it is still more over-
simplified.181 Justice Jackson creates a classic interpretation of inter-branch relations that divides 
them into three simple categories that only consider agreement or disagreement between the 
president and Congress. Although he emphasizes  “the imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables rather than…abstract theories of law,” it is not likely that Jackson at the time was 
able to predict how much executive power would expand (i.e. how much presidents have 
increased their exercise of UPDs in the last half century), how dysfunctional Congress has 
become, and how inter-branch conflict has intensified.182 As William G. Howell notes, “the 
ability to act unilaterally speaks to what is distinctly ‘modern’ about the modern presidency.”183 
Karl Manheim and Allan Ides also add that, “in [the president] administering and enforcing the 
laws created by Congress, it is inevitable that some degree of quasi legislative and quasi 
adjudicating will occur.”184 In addition, certain areas of policy such as foreign affairs, where the 
Legislative and Executive have concurrent claims of authority, warrant a more nuanced 
framework for categorizing presidential power, one that takes into account  the realities of power 
sharing within the modern American federalist system.185 
 The second reason Justice Jackson’s presidential power framework is not sufficient for 
categorizing presidential powers in contemporary government is that it is difficult to apply to 
immigration law. Although virtually every issue has some degree of legislative and executive 
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claims to power, immigration is one that “implicates far more than the separation of power 
between the president and Congress, [because it] also entails significant questions regarding the 
division of power between the federal government and the states.”186 While the Legislative 
Branch enacts policy, the Executive Branch enforces it. In addition, while the federal government 
enacts and enforces policy, state and local governments most directly bear the consequences of 
such activity, perhaps bearing the most those that concern undocumented immigrants. As Texas 
v. United States and cases before it such as Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer (2014) 
demonstrate, federal policies that grant deferred action status to masses of undocumented 
immigrants can cause economic burdens to states with large undocumented immigrant 
populations. In a more general sense, “state and local authorities play an important role in the 
regulation of immigration because they shape the conditions of daily life for immigrants in their 
jurisdictions.”187  
 Catherine Y. Kim, Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina School of Law, 
notes that for these reasons, ordinary constitutional rules—like arguably, the Youngstown 
framework—are inapplicable to immigration law.188 Most scholars, she argues, have focused 
instead on the federalism aspects of immigration law such as immigration exceptionalism, which 
involves the arguably distinctive allocation of authority over immigration between the federal 
government and the states, with the federal government having preemptive power over all 
immigration issues.189 Kim further notes that, particularly today, the scope of the Executive 
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Branch’s preemptive power in this sphere is “one of the most pressing questions in immigration 
law” because a great bulk of contemporary immigration policymaking stems not from Congress, 
but rather from Executive Branch agencies and states.190 Congress, in its state of partisan 
gridlock, “coupled with shifting political alliances over national immigration policy, exacerbate 
the legislative inertia that exists in other areas of federal regulation.”191 As a result, employing a 
presidential power framework that fails to address both the horizontal (inter-branch) and vertical 
(federal to state) power structures provides more questions than answers on the limits of 
executive vis-à-vis legislative power in immigration law. 
2. Analysis of DACA/DAPA Under Youngstown Framework 
 Having determined that Justice Jackson’s tripartite presidential power framework is not 
the best metric to categorize today’s Presidential actions, specifically those that lie within the 
sphere of immigration, it is important nonetheless to consider why each zone may or may not be 
applicable to DACA and DAPA. 
a) Zone 1 
 The first zone of Justice Jackson’s presidential power framework “places the President at 
the apex of his powers when acting with the ‘expressed or implied’ authorization of 
Congress.’”192 This zone describes the situation in which Congress has explicitly delegated power 
to the Executive Branch or otherwise authorized its actions. Justice Jackson added that executive 
action in this zone would be given the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation” and “supported 
by the strongest presumption.”193 Zone 1 is inapplicable in this case, since in promulgating 
extended DACA and DAPA, the Obama Administration did not act with delegated power from 
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Congress and it did not act in response to authorization of any kind. The Executive Branch, 
instead, acted using its own prosecutorial discretionary power, a power, that as aforementioned, 
does not require express delegation from Congress.194 Prosecutorial discretion “is generally seen 
as affording the Executive wide latitude in determining when, against whom, how, and even 
whether to prosecute apparent violations of Federal law.”195 
b) Zone 2  
 In the second zone, or “zone of twilight,” presidential action requires a balance against 
any harms to constitutional rights or structure.196 On its face, DACA and DAPA may be a  Zone 
2 situation under Justice Jackson’s categorization, in that the president arguably acted in the 
“absence of either congressional grant or denial of authority.”197 In 2012, Congress’ failure to 
enact the DREAM Act, which would have provided a path to citizenship to undocumented 
immigrants brought to the U.S. as children, pushed the president to create DACA, a program that 
to this day has survived legal battles. Similarly, in 2014, following Congress’ failure to enact 
comprehensive immigration reform, the president again was pressed to act and thus created 
extended DACA and DAPA. Yet “the fact that the president has historically taken some action in 
the face of congressional silence does not in itself mean that the president gets to keep doing it 
once Congress tells him to cut it out.”198 Zone 2 is unclear as to how to resolve DACA/DAPA, 
since Justice Jackson provided no clear mechanism for dealing with “zones of twilight.” 
c) Zone 3 
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 The third zone in Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework of presidential power places the 
president at his or her “lowest ebb.”199 This zone describes the situation in which the Executive 
Branch takes an action that goes against the “expressed or implied” will of Congress.200 But in 
promulgating DACA and DAPA, President Obama did not act against the “expressed or implied” 
will of Congress. Although some scholars like Josh Blackmun argue that Congress has expressed 
and/or implied opposition to President Obama’s executive actions by not passing comprehensive 
immigration reform, not passing similar deferred action programs, and having sought to defund 
DAPA, the question remains whether such actions, or lack thereof, constitute “expressed or 
implied” wills of Congress.201 Only in the case where the President acts contrary to Congress’ 
denial of authority, expressed by means of legislation that explicitly denies the Executive Branch 
discretionary power in the immigration context or by implicit but clear rejection of the executive 
action, would Zone 3 apply. 
 No such clear intent can be imputed to the deeply divided modern Congress.  To suggest 
that congressional gridlock on the immigration issue is evidence that the president acted counter 
to the “expressed or implied” will of Congress is an incorrect conclusion. The White House and 
most in Congress have longed for an overhaul of the country’s immigration system since the last 
major bipartisan immigration reform in 1986 under the Reagan Administration. Since then, 
immigration reform bills have been introduced and, in part, passed but then ultimately shut down 
in both chambers of Congress. These attempts—which include, most notably, the Border, 
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, also called the Sensenbrenner bill 
(H.R. 4437) proposed in 2005 and the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
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Modernization Act (S. 744) proposed in 2013— and the threats of government shutdowns have 
all failed to pass. Therefore, Congress’ failed efforts to oppose or support President Obama’s 
policies and to pass comprehensive immigration reform proposals are not evidence of implicit 
opposition to Obama, but rather, are illustrative of Congress’ inability to arrive at a unified stand 
on immigration and to act altogether.   
 Second, the claim that similar deferred action programs were not created by Congress is 
evidence of DACA and DAPA’s inconsistency with the Legislative Branch’s “expressed or 
implied” will is also incorrect. As aforementioned, the absence of congressional action cannot be 
in and of itself considered implicit opposition of the president’s programs.  It is in this discussion 
that the distinction between “lawful status” and “lawful presence” is important, as it describes the 
types of statuses that the Legislative and Executive branches can grant to undocumented 
immigrants. “Whereas legal status implies a ‘right protected by law,’ legal presence simply 
reflects an ‘exercise of discretion by a public official.’”202 USCIS confirms “an individual who 
has received deferred action is authorized by DHS to be present in the U.S., and is therefore 
considered by DHS to be lawfully present during the period deferred action is in effect. However, 
deferred action does not confer lawful status upon an individual, nor does it excuse any previous 
or subsequent periods of unlawful presence.”203 Like DACA, extended DACA and DAPA would 
grant “lawful presence” to otherwise undocumented immigrants residing in the U.S. illegally  (i.e. 
unlawfully present), not “lawful status” such as citizenship or Lawful Permanent Resident status, 
statuses that may only be granted by legislation. Therefore, to say that because Congress did not 
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create similar programs is evidence of their opposition to them is unfounded, as the Executive 
Branch has the exclusive power to use discretion in enforcing immigration law. That is 
indisputable. However, what is disputed is whether the President has abused this power and acted 
against congressional will by categorically granting deferred action status to classes of 
individuals instead of using discretion on a case-by-case basis.  
 Third, attempts to defund DAPA as evidence of “expressed or implied” will of Congress 
in opposition of DACA and DAPA is a faulty political presumption at best, rather than a policy 
objection. When Congress threatened to defund the Department of Homeland Security in early 
2015, threatening a government shutdown (again204), the Senate had recently gained a Republican 
majority in the midterm elections a few months prior, giving the party control over both 
chambers. However, even with this majority, the House bill set to defund DHS failed and not 
because of Democrats. An article published by The Hill called the ordeal “GOP infighting” as 
House and Senate Republicans were at odds on whether or not to defund DHS because of 
President Obama’s immigration actions. The House bill contained provisions that would strip 
away the president’s executive actions. GOP Senators like Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) called for a vote on 
a “clean” DHS spending bill stripped of immigration language, while other conservatives called 
for Senate GOP leader Mitch McConnell “to gut the Senate’s filibuster if necessary to move the 
House bill to President Obama.”205 In the end, the vote fell short and a “clean” DHS funding bill 
was passed, avoiding a partial government shutdown. This episode, threatening an imminent 
government shutdown as a result of a divided and dysfunctional GOP, demonstrates how partisan 
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divide and intra-partisan divide in Congress makes it impossible to ascertain that Congress as a 
whole has expressed or implied any unified stance on the legality of President Obama’s executive 
actions.  
3. A Fourth Zone? – A Look at the Relational Conception Model 
 Although Justice Jackson’s tripartite presidential powers framework in Youngstown is a 
useful took for disciplining separation of powers analysis, the framework lacks consideration of 
important contextual factors that warrant executive action in certain times over others. Mariah 
Zeisberg, political scientist and Associate Professor at the University of Michigan, expands the 
“zone of twilight” in the Zone 2 of the framework with her interpretation of constitutional politics 
in settling inter-branch disputes over institutional and constitutional authority to take the country 
to war. Contrary to the Youngstown framework which asks only whether the branches agree or 
disagree, the relational model questions to what extent inter-branch “agreement or disagreement 
with one another is predicated on the application of their constitutional strengths to the matter at 
hand.”206 Branches of government generate constitutional authority when they “mobilize their 
institutional capacities, develop good understandings of the security needs of the moment, and 
place themselves in responsive relationship."207   
a) The Relational Conception Explained 
 Zeisberg, in her book entitled War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority, 
develops “the relational conception,” a robust theoretical model designed to put value in inter-
branch interpretative struggle in the dispute over constitutional war authority. In light of the fact 
that “the Constitution does not draw clear boundaries between legislative and executive powers in 
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a variety of policy areas,” including war, the relational model focalizes on Legislative-Executive 
branch interactions rather than strict textual interpretations of the Constitution.208 Zeisberg states 
that the “relational conception…asks us to engage a set of decidedly political and contextual 
questions about institutional performance in developing meaning for constitutional 
vocabulary.”209 She identifies this model as the best rationale for broad presidential war powers 
when circumstances demand them.210   
 The relational model is best employed in situations in which both the Legislative and 
Executive branches have legitimate claims of authority over a particular action, such as declaring 
and conducting war. In such cases, Zeisberg argues that one must “evaluate [the branches] in 
terms of how well they bring their special institutional capacities to bear on the problem of 
interpreting the Constitution’s substantive standards.”211 That is, one must assess constitutional 
performance, not whether Congress, for example, has voted to authorize war, but “rather whether 
deliberation about the war is done the proper way and for the right reason.”212 Moreover, the 
theory “prioritizes good judgment in the particular context over and above consistency across 
cases,” thus rejecting “precedent-based reasoning.”213 This normative way of assessing 
constitutional authority in the context of war is outlined as follows:  
1) Identify relevant substantive terms at stake in the Constitution’s allocation of power. 
This first prong requires identifying the substantive standards for the allocation of 
power in the text of the Constitution and indicating why the powers have been 
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distributed as they have been. Using the war power as an example, Zeisberg 
identifies the preamble of the Constitution as a source of substantive standards that 
commit all institutions to advance the “general warfare” and a system of “common 
defense.” While the president vows to “preserve, protect, and defend” the 
constitutional order, the Legislature is granted the authority to “declare war.” 
Zeisberg notes that the most common distinction between the “war” that requires 
legislative authorization and that which the president may authorize is with 
reference to scale. Though the Constitution’s idea of war may be “big” wars that are 
expensive, time consuming, and pose heavy risk of casualties, Zeisberg notes that 
there are some conceptual problems with this demarcation. Congress’ power to issue 
letters of marque and reprisal, for one, implies that Congress has legislative 
authority over small and big wars. And second, “small” wars that are anticipated to 
be cheap, can become big, expensive, and may be highly significant for foreign 
policy. Zeisberg argues that Congress’ substantial role in foreign policy, as 
illustrated by its powers in Article I, § 8, is “for good reason [since] legislatures can 
be useful institutions for developing sound policy in a complex world.”214 In 
addition, the president’s oath to “preserve, protect, and defend” implies war powers 
and is widely accepted as also meaning that the President’s use of military force 
must be for defensive purposes. 
2) Identify the institutional process(es) harnessed to give content to that substantive 
vocabulary. These institutional processes, Zeisberg argues,  “are based on the 
branches’ distinctive governance capacities and structural positions.”215 She 
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identifies three important structural conditions for the ordinary and constitutional 
politics of national security. Named the “conditions of conflict,” they are 1) that 
each branch enjoys an independent source of political authority; 2) that the branches 
have distinctive governance capacities (which thereby create distinctive 
perspectives on public matters); and 3) that the actual exercise of each branches’ 
powers brings them into a relationship with one another. The first condition, that 
each branch enjoys an independent source of political authority, discusses how 
officials in either branch are elected and by whom. The president and legislators are 
elected from different geographical bases (i.e. the president, in a nationwide vote 
decided by the Electoral College, and Congress, by their respective constituencies in 
either states or districts) and for different periods of time (e.g. House members for 
two years, Presidents for four, and Senate members are elected for six years in 
staggered times). The branches do not rely on each other for continuity in office nor 
evaluation, with the exception of presidential impeachment. And finally, no officials 
can work in multiple branches.  
 The second condition, that the branches have distinctive governance capacities and 
therefore distinctive political perspectives on public matters, discusses the rules that 
configure the offices and support each branch in performing its designated 
functions. Vis-à-vis each other, the Legislative and Executive Branch have different 
governance capacities. Legislatures, for example “enjoy a special capacity to clarify 
the dimensions of conflict, that exist in civil society; to harness the intelligence of its 
members, who may have important experience in security; they also have special 
capacities to advance broad consensuses and to make general law that 
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accommodates many different points of view.”216 The Executive Branch, which 
Zeisberg calls a “unitary office” and “the most efficient of the three,” enjoys the 
capacity to “deliver military responses, provide initiative to the legislature, provide 
for law enforcement” in addition to its diplomatic, intelligence , and consultative 
capacities.217 Zeisberg notes that in the war power context, Congress often assesses 
war with a focus more on domestic costs, while presidents are often more alert to 
war’s diplomatic implications. An example Zeisberg gives of how each branch’s 
distinct structures encourage divergent judgments on constitutional meaning is 
Salmon Chase, Secretary of the Treasury under the Lincoln Administration, who 
supported the President in issuing paper money during the Civil War to raise money 
without raising taxes, which he advocated for because he viewed winning the war as 
a constitutional imperative. However, when he became a Supreme Court justice, he 
argued that the money he had advocate for violated the constitutional rights of the 
individual. 
3) Theorize the terms on which these different processes are related to one another. 
This prong requires identification of the terms on which the branches are related (i.e. 
analysis of the inter-branch relationship). The third condition of the “conditions of 
conflict” emphasizes the important inter-branch relationship that premises the 
relational conception framework: “that the actual exercise of their powers brings the 
branches into relationship with one another, a relationship that may activate the 
conflictual possibilities inherent in their independent sources of authority and 
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distinctive perspectives on public matter.”218 This requires determining how the 
exercise of each branches’ powers brings them into a relationship with one another, 
that is, determining what their shared powers and duties are. In the war context, 
Zeisberg argues that in order to be effective, many government decisions require the 
cooperation of more than just one branch. The government’s power to make war is 
shared by the Executive and the Legislative Branch because the activity required to 
make war such as raise funds, organize troops, deploy them, communicate with 
foreign governments, and negotiate and ratify peace treaties, can only be done with 
the cooperation of both branches. 
4) Develop standards related to these institutional processes. These processual 
standards, as Zeisberg notes, are intended to evaluate each branches’ political 
performance by assessing “whether each institution demonstrated appropriate regard 
for reasons that were in fact, or should have been, available; whether they were 
appropriately responsive to one another; and whether the institutions were applying 
appropriately their own distinctive strengths to the problem at hand.”219 These 
standards help to assess whether or not the branches used powers responsibly.  
The first processual standard requires that each branch politically defend its 
judgment. She states, “the processual standard of independent judgment asks that 
each branch view itself as authorized and equipped to judge the constitutional and 
policy claims that it confronts while conducting its business.”220  An example 
Zeisberg mentions of a president using his independent judgment in acts of war is 
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President John F. Kennedy during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. In the fall of 
1962, President Kennedy assured Congress that there were no offensive missiles in 
Cuba, confirmed by statements from the Soviet Union and beliefs from U.S. 
intelligence. However, when it became apparent that there were missiles on the 
island, he decided not to notify Congress or the public, notifying only allies. He 
initiated a blockade which was kept under wraps and was not announced until it was 
being executed. Although this act of war was not statutorily authorized by Congress, 
it was justified according to the president’s independent war authority during the 
Cold War. 
A second processual standard Zeisberg develops is that “the branches engage in a 
reasoning over public policy that is sensitive to the []realities they encounter.” 221 
This standard means that each branch should be equipped, as a result of exposure, to 
use reality-based assessments about security in their deliberations. Both the 
president and Congress should (and should be able to) assess knowledge, multiple 
considerations, alternatives, and prioritization in their deliberations, confirming that 
their deliberations are premised on reality rather than fantasy. In the Cuban Missile 
Crisis example, President Kennedy, before initiating a blockade, was aware of the 
possible threat of the Soviet Union shipping missiles to Cuba. Thus, he initiated a 
process to coordinate the views of the Executive Branch intelligence analysts, who 
came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union could get “considerable military 
advantage from placing longer range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or, more likely, 
establishing a base for missile-launching submarines there,” but that such behavior 
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was unlikely because of the risk it would cause to the U.S.-Soviet relationship.222 
However,  the missiles did became a reality, though not an immediate one. Realities 
such as that the U.S. had been threatened by Russian missiles for some time and that 
their existence would not affect the strength of the U.S.’ retaliatory response, put 
into question whether Kennedy’s reasoning to engage in war activity was sensitive 
to the realties he was faced with. The reality was that the “Cuban missile crisis was 
a threat,…but it did not itself represent an immediate hostile invasion or even the 
threat of an immediate hostile invasion.”223 
A third processual standard is that “the branches actually link their arguments about 
constitutional authority to their substantive agendas.”224 This standard pertains to 
whether each branch makes judgments vulnerable to repudiation by the other 
branch. This standard does not imply the value of inter-branch agreement, but 
rather, the value of inter-branch deliberation.   In the Cuban missile crisis example, 
Zeisberg states that “the processes Kennedy used in the lead-up to the blockage fell 
within the terms of the bipartisan consensus.”225 Congress had pressured Kennedy to 
act and many attacked him for ignoring a building crisis. This frustration and 
perception of a weak president translated into bipartisan legislation which granted 
the president authority to call reservists into armed forces without opposition and a 
resolution which expressed determination “to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of 
an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United 
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States.”226 Though none of Congress’ personal pleas to act in bipartisan meetings 
with the president, which included aggressive advocacy for military action, 
represent congressional authorization of Kennedy’s war action, Zeisberg notes that 
he was clearly acting “within the terms set by elites of both parties.”227 After all, in 
Executive Committee deliberation, Kennedy revealed he feared impeachment if he 
did nothing to counter the Cuban missiles. However, when Kennedy was warned of 
possible missiles in Cuba, he tried to keep them quiet because he judged that the 
information he was receiving did not signify a threat and he wanted to avoid public 
hysteria and Republican opposition. Preserving secrecy supported his capacity to 
make an independent and distinctive presidential judgment. Zeisberg notes that 
although the president’s constitutional authority according to this condition would 
have been enhanced had he been transparent to the full Congress sooner, “his use of 
secrecy to protect the political space he needed to come to a developed judgment of 
his own enhanced the constitutional authority available to him under the processual 
standards associated with the second condition of conflict.”228 
Another standard Zeisberg creates is one that assesses the branches’ relationship to 
an electorate. For the president, his positional authority stems from a plethora of 
resources, including intelligence, diplomacy, and agencies which he or she can 
mobilize. Zeisberg calls for assessing the decision-making of the president by how 
he or she utilizes the intelligence, diplomatic, and consultative capacities of the 
Executive Branch. Zeisberg contends that in the Cuban missile crisis, “Kennedy 
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benefited deeply from his office’s resources and then advanced his policies in a 
coherent way for legislative judgment.”229 Having run a presidential campaign that 
promised a more active foreign policy in which the U.S. would participate in 
‘counterinsurgency’ against communist guerillas and support developing nations in 
resisting communism, he displayed considerable political awareness. He used a 
great deal of bipartisan consultation procedures which included a bipartisan meeting 
with Republican and Democratic leadership to discuss Cuba. He also took full 
advantage of Executive Committee deliberative resources which helped to develop 
possible responses to the missile crisis as well as their domestic political 
consequences. Zeisberg also commends Kennedy for his skillful use of intelligence 
capacities (i.e. CIA, the Defense Department) at his disposal which accomplished 
the difficult task of discovering the missiles to begin with.  
5)  Assess moments of constitutional politics in terms of those relevant substantive and 
processual standards.230 Zeisberg notes that the relational conception model is 
“political” in that it considers that constitutional authority is “judged by electoral 
branches, that the branches develop and evaluate constitutional claims in ways that 
are at least partially responsive to governance needs; that their reasoning is 
grounded in the relatively open web that is characteristic of public policy 
justification; that their constitutional positions are reflected by partisanship and 
other forms of affiliative reasoning; and that the relational conception prioritizes 
judgment that is relatively resistant to precedent-based reasoning and yet can be 
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done well, nonetheless ethical.”231 In the Cuban missile crisis example, President 
Kennedy’s decision to act in Cuba and keep the mission a secret from Congress and 
the public until it was being enacted was in part motivated by politics. Zeisberg 
notes that “Kennedy was embedded in a political context that made it unlikely he 
could achieve the full authority connected to each dimension of the relational 
conception’s standards at the time.”232 For given the Cold War ideology, the danger 
posed by the Cuban missiles was a shift in the balance of power politics. While 
congressional Democrats were concerned over escalation and held back Republican 
efforts to pass a direct legal war authorization, Republicans pushed for action, some 
arguing even after the crisis was over that the president was not being forceful 
enough and that he had ignored important CIA warnings.  
b) Taking Youngstown a Step Further    
 The relational conception is a model that goes beyond Justice Jackson’s framework 
which, particularly in regard to Zone 2, does not provide guidance on how to deal with many 
situations.  In contrast, the relational conception model provides a clear step-by-step mechanism 
for assessing the branches that rejects Justice Jackson’s “emphasis on inter-branch agreement or 
disagreement as a generalized pivot for constitutional authority because it explicitly contemplates 
the possibility that both conflict and settlement may be linked to the branches’ exercise of their 
institutional strengths.”233 Zeisberg argues that asking only whether the branches agree or 
disagree fails to answer the central question of the model, which seeks to understand to what 
extent the the branches’ agreement or disagreement is “predicated on the application of their 
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constitutional strengths on the matter at hand.”234 As Political Scientist Jeremy D. Bailey notes, it 
is clear that Zeisberg’s methodology improves Justice Jackson’s tripartite framework for 
presidential powers in Youngstown by considering whether and when inter-branch agreement is 
properly authoritative.235  It does this by allowing scholars to “evaluate executive and legislative 
actions in context and relationship and ask whether they are successfully using their distinctive 
capacities for governance rather than evaluating them against a rigid list of rules.”236 In addition, 
it enables a normative analysis of constitutional politics in light of constitutional ideals and that 
seeks governance that is consistent with the explicit and implicit values manifest in how the 
Constitution allocates power.237 These features are what make this model appropriate for 
assessing DACA/DAPA.  
c) Analysis of DACA/DAPA Under the Relational Conception 
i. Substantive Standards 
 The first step of the relational conception framework is to identify the relevant substantive 
terms at stake in the Constitution’s allocation of power and indicate why the powers have been 
distributed as they have been. In the immigration sphere, the Constitution offers a rather limited 
set of substantive standards to both the Legislative and Executive for fulfilling their institutional 
responsibilities. Much like other policy areas, immigration is also a policy area in which the 
Constitution provides no branch of government (the Legislative or Executive) enumerative power 
to regulate. It does, however, entrust the Legislative Branch with the first substantive standard in 
Article I, § 8, clause 4 of the Constitution: the power to “establish an uniform Rule of 
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Naturalization.” 238 That is, Congress has the responsibility to craft the laws that determine how 
and when noncitizens can become naturalized citizens of the United States.239 The Take Care 
Clause provides the first substantive standard for the president: that he “shall take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed.”240 In the immigration context, this means that the president is 
responsible for seeing that the immigration law, which Congress passes, is faithfully executed. In 
other areas of immigration where the Constitution remains silent, the Supreme Court has 
provided guidance through judicial review. 
 Historically, the Supreme Court has upheld nearly all manner of federal statues regulating 
immigration.241 In doing so it has acknowledged that in the federal government lies a broad 
power to regulate the admission, removal, and naturalization of noncitizens, a power that is now 
considered an inherent sovereign power.242 The Supreme Court, in its earliest cases looked to the 
federal power over foreign commerce as a source of power over immigration. The Commerce 
Clause in Article I, § 8, clause 3, of the Constitution provides Congress with the power "to 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." In addition, the War 
Power, found in Article I, § 8, clause 11, could also be cited as a potential source of federal 
control over immigration, even though it gives Congress the authority to “ declare war.”243 The 
Naturalization Clause in Article I, § 8, clause 4, has also served as an argument for federal 
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control over immigration, though it explicitly gives Congress only the authority “to establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”  
 International human rights law scholar David Weissbrodt and immigration attorney Laura 
Danielson argue that in viewing the Constitution with original intent, these three clauses 
(Commerce, War, and Naturalization) together imply a federal right to regulate non-citizens, 
though that “later [Supreme Court] cases clarified that such constitutional provisions are not the 
source of an implied right of the federal government to regulate non-citizens, but only to show 
that the federal government is the national government and therefore the keeper of inherent 
sovereign power to regulate international affairs.”244 The Court has repeatedly stated that the 
regulation of immigration implicates the foreign affairs power, a power presidents have also 
claimed in issuing executive actions on immigration.245 In addition, as recently as 2012 in 
Arizona v. U.S., the Supreme Court recognized that prosecutorial discretion in immigration cases 
is an inherent constitutional power that the Executive Branch holds.  
 All in all, the power to make immigration policy is a power that is shared by the 
Legislative and the Executive branches primarily because the Constitution’s text is not clear on 
the question. In fact, the Supreme Court in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889) held that the 
federal government has the authority to regulate migration, even though such a power is not 
enumerated in the Constitution.246 This decision and subsequently others led to the creation of the 
plenary power doctrine, which grants Congress the plenary power to make and regulate 
immigration policy while limits the Judiciary’s power to police immigration regulation. The 
Court has since emphasized that immigration is an issue best left to the political branches. 
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ii. Institutional Processes 
 The second step of the relational conception framework is to identify the institutional 
processes harnessed to give content to the substantive vocabulary discussed in step one. Here, the 
institutional processes will be identified by addressing the first two “conditions of conflict.”  
 The first, that each branch enjoys an independent source of political authority, will 
address how each branch was elected and by whom. The political authority of President Obama, 
in this respect, stems first from his nomination as the Democratic candidate for the presidency 
and subsequently from his election and reelection to the presidency by a nationwide vote decided 
by the Electoral College. Of course, upon taking office, the president does not only represent the 
Democratic Party, but rather, he represents the nation as a whole, which naturally requires him to 
perform his responsibilities as president vis-à-vis opposing party views, particularly those 
expressed by Congress. The president’s political authority is also independent from that of 
Congress which need not (and does not always) hold majorities in the party of the president. 
President Obama enjoys this authority for the remainder of his second term until January 2017, 
free from congressional evaluation, with the exception of impeachment.  
 The independent source of political authority for the Legislative Branch is also 
independent from that of the president. Members of Congress, both in the Senate and House of 
Representatives, enjoy an independent source of political authority which stems from their 
election into office by their respective constituencies in either states or districts and for different 
periods of time. Midterm elections, which elect 435 House of Representatives and 33 or 34 of the 
total 100 Senators, can play a decisive role in shifting the party majorities in both chambers. In 
the midterm elections of 2014, weeks before President Obama announced his executive actions, 
the Democratic Party lost nine Senate seats and thirteen House seats, causing the Republican 
party to gain control of the Senate for the first time since 2006 and increase its majority in the 
 79 
House. This also resulted in two different parties leading the Legislative and Executive branches, 
in itself a prime catalyst for inter-branch conflict.  
     The second condition of conflict, that the branches have distinctive governance capacities and 
therefore distinctive political perspectives on public matters, will address what each branches’ 
governance capacities are in immigration and how those capacities affect their political 
perspectives on DACA/DAPA. In immigration, the Executive Branch’s governance capacity is 
centered in law enforcement and foreign policy. Historically, the president can issue executive 
actions or orders to address immigration concerns such as it has done with DACA/DAPA. Since 
the president is not an agency, such programs are not subject to regulations of the APA, 
consistent with the president’s broad discretion in immigration. Agencies like the Department of 
Homeland Security, however, are. Founded in 2002, DHS is the Executive agency geared with 
keeping America safe. Its mission is: “to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This 
requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in jobs that range from aviation and 
border security to emergency response, from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility 
inspector.”247 In fulfilling this mission, DHS holds the executive power of prosecutorial 
discretion, “[a] discretion not to immediately arrest or endeavor to removal an illegal immigrant 
because the immigrant does not meet the federal government’s immigration-enforcement 
priorities.”248 During the Obama Administration, the agency has assessed immigration law 
enforcement with a focus on both the cost and feasibility of removing the estimated 11-12 million 
undocumented immigration and on national security. Citing its “severe resource constraint,” DHS 
has prioritized the enforcement of immigration law to “threats to national security, public safety, 
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and border security,” over the undocumented immigrants that would otherwise be eligible for 
deferred action under DACA/DAPA.249  
 Presidents also evaluate their immigration policies in light of their foreign policy 
objectives. For example, in 2014 the U.S. faced a humanitarian crisis when an influx of 
unaccompanied minors from violence-ridden Central American countries crossed the U.S.-
Mexico border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported that in fiscal year 2014, between 
October 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014, 68, 541 unaccompanied children were apprehended at 
the southwest border.250 President Obama, faced with considering how his response may affect 
the U.S.’ international reputation and credibility, approved a plan to allow thousands of young 
children from Central American countries apply for refugee status.  
 On the other hand, the Legislative Branch’s governance capacities with respect to 
immigration are to advance broad consensuses and to pass immigration laws that accommodate 
the different points of view of the nation, as expressed by Members of Congress. During 
Obama’s presidency, Congress has specifically sought to overhaul or rather, reform current 
immigration law. As evidenced by the bipartisan immigration bill proposed in the Senate during 
President Obama’s first term, S. 744 “Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration 
Modernization Act,” Congress has generally identified areas of reform that focus on long-term 
and sustainable modifications of current immigration law which address legalization of certain 
undocumented immigration, new employment-based immigrant visas, mechanisms for stronger 
border and interior enforcement, and the creation of an “enhanced and flexible system of rules for 
                                                 
249 Johnson, Policies for the Apprehension. 
250 “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children FY 2014,” CBP, Official Website of the 
Department of Homeland Security, accessed March 2016, http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-
border-unaccompanied-children/fy-2014.  
 81 
future immigration flows.”251 Forming a consensus on these points is unquestionably one of the 
reasons that make legislating at times arduous and time-consuming,  particularly when the views 
of Members of Congress are often contingent on the realities they face, such as the number of 
estimated undocumented immigrants residing in their respective states or districts. For example, 
it is no coincidence that the states in opposition to DACA/DAPA include states like Texas and 
Arizona which hold anywhere from half a million to over two million undocumented immigrants 
and thus, face specific challenges that other states such as Maine, with less than 40,000 
undocumented immigrants, may not.252  
iii. The Inter-Branch Relationship 
 The third condition of conflict is that the actual exercise of each branches’ powers brings 
them into a relationship with one another. This step requires theorizing the terms on which each 
branches’ institutional processes, discussed in step two, are related to one another in making, 
regulating, and enforcing immigration policy. In terms of making immigration policy, with the 
rise of the modern administrative state, Congress has delegated more of its immigration powers to 
the Executive. Some examples of these delegated powers are: the authority to determine whether 
certain foreigners should be granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS), the authority to 
determine whether a person is to be allowed to work in the U.S., the authority to grant a person 
permission to be in the U.S. when the person does not qualify for a visa, and the authority to 
decide whether a person’s deportation should be deferred. Historically, presidents have exercised 
all of these powers. As aforementioned, President H.W. Bush granted Salvadoran refugees TPS 
                                                 
251 Built to Last: How Immigration Reform Can Deter Unauthorized Immigration (Washington, 
D.C.: American Immigration Council, May 20, 2013), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/built-
last-how-immigration-reform-can-deter-unauthorized-immigration.  
252 Jeffrey S. Passel and D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States: 
II. Where Do They Live? (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, April 14, 2009), accessed March 
2016, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/14/ii-where-do-they-live/.  
 82 
status in 1990, a status that President Clinton extended during his first term, and nearly all 
presidents since President Reagan have issued some sort of executive action or order that granted 
deferred action status and work authorizations to certain undocumented immigrants. President 
Obama is the most recent president to exercise this power through the creation of DACA and 
extended DACA/DAPA.  
 Apart from delegated powers, the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch share the 
power of enforcing immigration law because the activity required to enforce it, particularly in the 
removal of immigrants deemed deportable by Congress, can only be done by the cooperation of 
both branches. This cooperation requires that the president and Congress inform and assist each 
other, especially when enforcement issues arise. For example, Congress decides how much 
funding DHS is to receive each fiscal year. Like other agencies, DHS is constrained by the 
resources (i.e. funding) that Congress votes to allot it. DHS claims that with this funding it is able 
to remove approximately 400,000 undocumented immigrants per year.253 Simple calculations 
demonstrate that it is impossible, at least with this limited funding, to deport all 11 or 12 
undocumented immigrants in any given year. Thus, in accordance with the amount of funds it 
received from Congress, DHS exercises its power of prosecutorial discretion to prioritize the 
deportation of certain undocumented immigrants, usually threats to national security, over others. 
 Cristina Rodriguez, writing for the Yale Law Journal, describes this relationship between 
the president and Congress as “[having] been defined by Congress’ dramatic expansion of federal 
immigration law over the course of the twentieth century through the creation of a complex, rule-
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bound legal code, which has given rise to a comprehensive regulatory system.”254 Congress has 
utilized its plenary powers to make a detailed immigration code covering substantive criteria for 
admitting and deporting immigrants. The president, on the other hand, has possessed 
“tremendous power” over core screening policy, particularly through asymmetrical de facto 
delegation from Congress. Congress, she explains, has delegated screening authority to the 
Executive by radically expanding the grounds of deportation and delegating the power to deport 
undocumented immigrants and to set enforcement priorities, which are essentially powers to 
screen immigrants at the back end of the system. These powers, she argues, have had the effect of 
giving the president tremendous policymaking power, particularly because of the sizable 
undocumented population residing in the country today. Rodriguez notes, “the significant 
population of formally deportable people gives the president vast discretion to shape immigration 
policy by deciding how (and over which types of immigrants) to exercise the option to deport.”255 
It is this asymmetrical de facto delegation model that drives the relationship—and conflict—
between Congress and the president today. 
iv. Processual Standards  
The fourth step in the relational conception model is to develop standards related to the 
institutional processes determined in step three. The standard that will be stressed in analyzing 
DACA/DAPA, and which is at the core of the relational conception model, is to determine 
whether the branches have used their powers responsibly. Though both branches have, to some 
degree, acted irresponsibly with respect to immigration, Congress has failed to act responsibly 
more than the president. In reforming the current immigration system, Congress has acted only in 
so far as proposing bills. It has otherwise failed to actually pass any of them into law. A report 
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released by the Center for American Progress, entitled, What the President Can Do on 
Immigration If Congress Fails to Act, remarks that as a result of failed legislation, “two-thirds of 
unauthorized immigrants currently living in the United States have resided here for more than a 
decade.”256 These statistics indicate that absent congressional reform, the immigration problem 
has only intensified, making it progressively more difficult (and costly) to deport masses of 
people, many of whom are now well integrated into communities across the country.  
The following analysis will assess two degrees of acting responsibly: 1) whether the 
branches have acted in immigration at all and 2) if they have, whether the action(s) were executed 
in a responsible fashion, meaning the branches acted in a coherent way, used their institutional 
strengths to address the problems reasonably, and acted with due attention and respect for the 
other branch.  First, however, it is important to contextualize congressional action by briefly 
describing the political landscape of views on immigration, for this has affected, in many 
respects, how the Legislative and the Executive branches have responded to the illegal 
immigration question.  Previously a bipartisan issue in the late 80s and early 90s, as evidenced by 
the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, immigration has become an increasingly 
divisive issue, stringently divided on partisan lines, with most Republicans vehemently against 
granting any sort of relief to undocumented immigrants, while most Democrats are generally 
united in giving some sort of relief, if not a path to citizenship, to nearly all undocumented 
immigrants. This shift from a bipartisan issue to a partisan-divided issue is reinforced by the way 
in which the Senate and House have voted in immigration reform bills in the past. The following 
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will discuss the legislative histories of congressional action with respect to comprehensive 
immigration reform and to providing a path to citizenship to undocumented minors. 
1. Congressional action on immigration reform: Congress’ most active comprehensive 
immigration reform efforts took place during the 109th and 110th Congresses (period 
from 2005-2009), efforts that heavily informed ensuing efforts in the 113th Congress 
(period from 2013 – 2015). A Congressional Research Service report detailing the 
history of these efforts states that “most policymakers agree that the main issues on 
comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) include increased border security and 
immigration enforcement, improved employment eligibility verification, revision of 
legal immigration, and [‘the thorniest of these issues’] options to address the millions 
of unauthorized aliens residing in the country.”257  
During the 109th Congress, although each chambers passed CIR bills “sweeping in 
scope [that] ranged from just under 500 pages to over 800 pages,” both chambers did 
not reach agreement on a comprehensive reform package which particularly addressed 
the status of undocumented immigrants.258  The House passed H.R. 4437, the “Border 
Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005,” also called 
the Sensenbrenner bill, named after the main sponsor, chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-W15). The Act, 
unpopular among most Democrats and favored by most Republicans, would have 
criminalized unauthorized presence. In a Republican-controlled House, the bill was 
debated and passed, as amended on December 16, 2005. The Senate, on the other 
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hand, passed S. 2611, the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006,” which 
proposed revisions to legal immigration including an expansion of the guest worker 
visa program and increased legal permanent admissions. S. 2611 also would have 
enabled certain undocumented immigrants to become Lawful Permanent Residents 
(LPRs) if they met certain criteria and paid penalty fees. The bill also included 
DREAM Act provisions. The bill passed, as amended, by a vote of 62-36 on May 25, 
2006.259 To overcome the disagreement between chambers and make it possible to 
form a conference committee on CIR, during the summer of 2006, CRS reports that 
congressional leaders attempted via procedural agreements to form such a committee 
but were unsuccessful. Thus, the separate bills passed in both chambers expired at the 
end of the 109th Congress.   
During the 110th Congress, on May 9, 2007, S. 1348, entitled “the Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act of 2007,” a bill virtually identical to S. 2611, was introduced 
by Democrat and Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid (D-NV) and co-sponsored by 
Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), and Ken 
Salazar (D-CO). The legislation, intended to overhaul the immigration system from 
enforcement to border security, included provisions which would have provided legal 
status and a path to citizenship to all undocumented immigrants residing illegally in 
the country, including DREAMers. Republican support for the bill was lacking. 
According to Roll Call, all 23 Republicans who had voted for S. 2611 in the 109th 
Congress sent Majority Leader Reid a letter “warning they would not vote for the 
measure again and calling on the Majority Leader to allow more time to work out a 
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bipartisan deal.”260 After being reported out of committee, it failed cloture (i.e. end of 
debate before voting on a bill) by Senate Republicans. A subsequent modified bill, 
sponsored by Ted Kennedy, S. 1639, was introduced on June 18, 2007 and followed a 
similar lifecycle, filibustered just ten days later with a failure to invoke cloture by a 
vote of 46 to 53 with both Democrats and Republicans opposing the cloture motion. 
The death of this bill marked a hiatus on comprehensive immigration reform efforts. 
The House did not act on CIR legislation during this Congress.  
It was not until the 113th Congress that the Legislative Branch reintroduced bipartisan 
efforts overhauling the immigration system. On April 16, 2013, Senator Charles 
Schumer (D-NY) introduced the Gang of Eight bill, S.744, “Border Security, 
Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.” The comprehensive 
immigration bill included a provision to provide legal status to the 11 million 
undocumented immigrants the U.S. With a Democratic majority in the Senate, the bill, 
as amended, was passed on June 27, 2013 by a vote of 68-32. An article released by 
the Center for American Progress called the passing of S.744 a  “historic and 
bipartisan step toward an immigration system that works for all.”261 Yet, the bill, like 
the rest of them, died and not by a filibuster. House Majority Leader John Boehner (R-
OH) instead refused to consider it or any immigration reform bill under his leadership. 
He blamed President Obama for the unaccompanied minor crisis of 2013 to 2014, 
when the number of Central American unaccompanied minors crossing the border 
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surged at unprecedented levels. Boehner stated: “the American people and their 
elected officials don’t trust him to enforce the law as written. Until this changes, it is 
going to be difficult to make progress on this issue…It is sad and disappointing that 
faced with this challenge President Obama won’t work with us, but is instead intent on 
going it alone with executive orders that can’t and won’t fix these problems.”262 The 
current 114th Congress has not introduced a comprehensive immigration bill of its 
kind. 
2. Congressional action on the DREAM Act: The Development, Relief, and Education 
for Alien Minor Act, otherwise known as, the DREAM Act, is a piece of bipartisan 
legislation first introduced in both chambers of Congress in 2001. The DREAM Act, 
at its core, is legislation that would help undocumented minors who meet certain 
requirements to have an opportunity to enlist in the military or go to college and have 
a path to citizenship. It was reintroduced in the 107th Congress as S. 1291 by Senators 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) in the Senate and as H.R. 1918 by 
Representatives Howard Berman (D-CA) and Chris Cannon (R-UT) in the House in 
2001.263 Since then, it “has come up for a vote several times and has garnered as many 
as 48 co-sponsors in the Senate and 152 in the House, yet it has failed to become 
law.”264 Between 2003 and 2004, even with Republican majorities in both chambers, 
the Act passed the Senate Judiciary Committee twice and as an amendment to the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) bill S. 2611 in 2006. After a similar CIR 
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bill failed in 2007, the Act was considered as a stand-alone bill, S. 2205, which 
garnered a bipartisan majority vote in the Senate but failed to invoke cloture. The Act 
was reintroduced during the 111th Congress, which had a Democratic majority in both 
chambers, as H.R. 5281. The bill was brought to a vote and passed by a vote of 216 to 
198. However, the bill died in the Senate on December 18, 2010, just five votes short 
of cloture (55-41).  
A report by the American Immigration Council contends that one of the main reasons 
the DREAM Act has failed to become law, although it has garnered broad support by 
both parties over the years, is that former supporters, mainly Republicans, have 
switched positions after coming under fire from their respective constituencies and 
challenges by the right.265 For example, Senator Orrin Hatch, the original Republican 
co-sponsor of the bill, switched from supporting the bill to being against it after facing 
criticism by his home state of Utah for being “liberal” on the issue. In addition, 
Republican Senator John McCain of Arizona, also a former co-sponsor of the Act, has 
since become more conservative on the issue as a result of his 2008 presidential 
campaign, while trying to appeal to a more right Republican base. 
 The legislative history on congressional efforts in comprehensive immigration reform 
indicate that the Legislative Branch has only acted in immigration in so far as introducing bills, 
rather than enacting legislation, its primary responsibility as the lawmaking branch of U.S. 
government. This mere fact puts into question the efficacy of Congress and its ability to leverage 
its institutional capacities to garner support in both chambers and fulfill its responsibility to pass 
legislation. Though it is difficult to assert that Congress has not acted at all—since at least 
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introducing bills and debating them is some action, though not enough—the action that has an 
effect on the status quo is law, not bills. Passing a bill in one branch is only half of the process to 
properly enact legislation.  
 What most puts into question Congress’ ability to perform its designated functions thus 
far, however, is not gridlock, but rather politics. The Gang of Eight Bill, the latest and most 
optimistic of congressional efforts to overhaul the immigration system, died in the 114th Congress 
because of the Republican leadership’s unwillingness to even consider it. The current Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) has also chosen to retaliate against the president for 
creating DAPA. In a press conference in August of 2015, McConnell stated when asked if 
immigration reform would be passed in the current Congress, “Not this Congress. I think when 
the president took the action he did, after the 2014 election, he pretty much made it impossible 
for us to go forward with immigration this Congress.”266 In addition, following the announcement 
of President Obama’s executive actions in 2014, GOP leaders immediately threatened to sue and 
impeach the president, describing his actions as “an abuse of power,” “lawless,” “wrong,” 
“wholly unconstitutional,” “reckless conduct,” and even asserting that the actions “literally could 
be the death of the Republic.”267  
 This political tactic of retaliating against and criticizing the president for policies it is not 
in favor of (i.e. DACA/DAPA) is telling of the Legislative Branches’ irresponsible conduct in 
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refusing to fulfill its constitutional obligations and work with the Executive Branch in an area of 
policy that demands a respectful and collaborative relationship between the branches, irrespective 
of their political affiliations. Congress has also acted irresponsibly in their attempt to dismantle 
the progress the president has made at the expense of putting the nation’s security at risk. In 
January of 2015, for example, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voted to not 
fund DHS in order to strip DHS of the funding it would need to implement extended DACA and 
DAPA. The measure passed the House by a margin of 236-191 and thus, threatened a 
government shutdown. The Senate, however, did not secure enough votes to pass such a measure 
and instead passed a “clean” funding bill free of provisions which would have defunded President 
Obama’s programs.  
By contrast, the Executive Branch has generally acted more responsibly than the 
Legislative Branch with respect to acting coherently and using its distinctive strengths to address 
illegal immigration. First, this analysis will discuss the ways in which the president has acted 
responsibly in immigration and then in ways in which he has not. One of the ways Zeisberg notes 
a president acts responsibly while facing a problem is when “he exercises his powers in ways that 
prompt Congress to address” said issue.268  
Since the last major immigration reform in 1986, various presidents have acted 
responsibly with respect to immigration, for many of their UPDs either were prompted by or 
prompted congressional action. For example, President Reagan issued an executive action 
shielding undocumented immigrants not covered by IRCA in 1987; the Immigration Act of 1990 
incorporated President H.W. Bush’s executive action shielding even more undocumented 
immigrants from deportation; and the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 
                                                 
268 Zeisberg, War Powers, 39. 
 92 
and the Haitian Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act provided legal status to refugee and immigrant 
groups that President Clinton, via executive action, protected from deportation years prior. Under 
this criterion, President Obama acted responsibly when he created DACA in 2012 and 
DACA/DAPA in 2014, for the actions played an important part in prompting Congress to bring 
forth legislation, both in line with and against the president’s actions. Those in line with the 
president’s actions include the bipartisan “Gang of Eight” bill proposed in the Senate in 2013, 
while those against include House Republican attempts to block DHS funding for President 
Obama’s immigration executive actions in 2015. Though both legislative attempts did not result 
in approval by both chambers of Congress, they constitute, at the very least, attempts of 
congressional action.  
Another way of demonstrating responsible conduct is, as Zeisberg notes, when the 
president, unpersuaded by Congress’ efforts (or lack thereof), takes action within his structural 
and processual capacities even during inter-branch conflict. In creating DACA in 2012 and then 
DACA/DAPA in 2014, President Obama acted responsibly in an area of policy where Congress 
time and again failed to act. The president enacted both measures with respect for the Legislative 
Branch, in that he actively called for it pass a comprehensive immigration reform bill, even 
promising to sign it into law. When the president created DACA, he expressed his 
disappointment with Congress, stating, “I have said time and time and time again to Congress 
that, send me the DREAM Act [which would have provided a path to citizenship to 
undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children], put it on my desk, and I will sign it 
right away.”269 But, since House Republicans blocked the bill, the president felt compelled to act 
within his structural and processual capacities (i.e. prosecutorial discretion) to shield millions of 
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young undocumented immigrants from deportation. Similarly, months prior to announcing 
DACA/DAPA, Obama stated, “‘I take executive action only when we have a serious problem, a 
serious issue and Congress chooses to do nothing. And in this situation, the failure of House 
Republicans to pass a darn bill [the 2013 “Gang of Eight” bipartisan bill which would have have 
created a pathway to citizenship to millions of undocumented immigrants] is bad for our 
economy’ and bad for our country.”270 Lack of legislation once again compelled the president to 
act by creating expanded DACA and DAPA to shield a larger group of undocumented 
immigrants from deportation.  
The president also acted responsibly in taking care that immigration laws were faithfully 
executed. While Congress debated impending immigration bills, President Obama 
(controversially) deported undocumented immigrants in record numbers. As of July 2014, “more 
than 4 million people [had] been removed from the United States since 2001, with 2 million 
people removed during the Obama administration alone.”271 DHS claims that during Obama’s 
first six years in office, the period from 2009 to 2014, approximately 2.4 million undocumented 
immigrants were removed from the United States.272 With a removal rate of nearly 400,000 a 
year, a figure that DHS, with the resources Congress provides it is able to remove per year, the 
president is “one of the most effective enforcers of the immigration laws” and accordingly, 
“cannot be accused of not enforcing the immigration laws.”273 Data alone proves that arguments 
claiming the president violated the Take Care Clause by creating DACA and DAPA without 
considering the fact that the president is using (and even exhausting) the resources delegated to 
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him to remove undocumented immigrants, are unsubstantiated. A president cannot, in practice, 
disregard the Take Care Clause when the Executive Branch exhausts all of its resources provided 
to him to faithfully execute the law.  
It is important to note, however, that in acting acting responsibly, new problems ensued. 
President Obama’s mass deportations led to a public outcry particularly among immigration 
activists who began to call him “Deporter-in-Chief.” This in turn impaired his political reputation 
and approval among liberal and Hispanic factions. Most importantly, the strict law enforcement 
prompted state and local municipalities to pass legislation that created “sanctuary cities,” cities 
that have policies designed to prohibit local law enforcement from complying with Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE). These sanctuary cities, which today amount to over 300 
nationwide, do not prosecute nor report resident undocumented immigrants to federal law 
enforcement.274 Whether these cities have or could impede the president from faithfully executing 
immigration law is an issue that, at least today, necessitates further study.  
 Although the president has acted responsibly in immigration in the various respects 
mentioned above, he has also acted irresponsibly. A major critique of President Obama in regards 
to immigration is that he waited nearly six years to act, acting only after re-election in 2012. 
When he campaigned for the presidency in 2008, he promised, “‘I can guarantee that we will 
have, in the first year, an immigration bill that I strongly support.’”275 No bill was proposed even 
as the Democratic Party controlled both chambers of Congress. He announced the Immigration 
                                                 
274 Bryan Griffith, Jessica Vaughan and Marguerite Telford, Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and 
States (Washington, D.C.: Center for Immigration Studies, January 2016), accessed March 2016, 
http://cis.org/Sanctuary-Cities-Map.  
275 Josh Hicks, “Obama’s failed promise of a first-year immigration overhaul,” The Washington 
Post, September 25, 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/obamas-failed-
promise-of-a-first-year-immigration-overhaul/2012/09/25/06997958-0721-11e2-a10c-
fa5a255a9258_blog.html  
 95 
Accountability Executive Action, the largest executive action on immigration to date, shortly 
after the Republican Party took control of the Senate in midterm elections, resulting in 
Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress, and at a time when “prospects for a 
congressional vote on immigration reform waned.”276 Unsurprisingly, twenty-six states, led by 
Texas, sued the administration. This puts into question whether President Obama truly acted 
responsibly in an area of policy so divided on partisan lines. 
v. Constitutional Politics  
The final step in the relational conception model is to assess the moments of constitutional 
politics in terms of the relevant substantive and processual standards. Zeisberg observes that 
“given the lack of an ultimately authoritative interpreter, it is the branches themselves that must 
construct useful meaning out of these substantive terms.”277 In Texas v. United States, the 
political nature of the dispute over which branch of government has the constitutional authority to 
promulgate DACA/DAPA is evident. While the federal government contends that DHS’s 
discretion over enforcement is consistent with the president’s constitutional “duty to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed,” citing Heckler v. Chaney (1985), where the Court 
recognized that “faithful” execution of the law implores the agency to “balance[e]…a number of 
factors,” such as allocation of resources and compatibility with existing overall agency 
policies,278 the Plaintiffs, twenty-six conservative states and critics, ignoring the failure of 
Congress to provide him adequate resources, still contend the president is not taking care to 
enforce the law.   
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Members of Congress are similarly engaged in interpretive struggle. On the one hand, a 
coalition of Republican Members of Congress, three senators and sixty-five House members, 
signed an amicus brief filed by the conservative advocacy group, the American Center for Law 
and Justice, claiming the actions are illegal.279 On the other hand, fifteen Democratic states, 
including California, New York, and the District of Columbia, filed a separate amicus brief 
stating the programs are necessary given congressional gridlock on immigration reform and that 
they denounce mass deportation for logistical and ethical reasons. 181 House Democrats 
similarly filed an amicus brief in support of the president’s executive actions.280  
However, where interpretative struggle will matter most is when the constitutional 
conflict posed by Texas v. United States is judged by the Supreme Court in June. The Supreme 
Court is composed of judges nominated and confirmed on some level of political and ideological 
criteria depending on the partisan affiliation of both the president that nominates them and the 
Senate that confirms them. Thus, like Members of Congress, even judges’ “constitutional 
positions are inflected by [some level of] partisanship and other forms of affiliative reasoning.”281 
Although the District Court for the Southern District of Texas Brownsville Division and the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, leaned conservative—the latter being “among the most conservative 
courts in the country”—and consequently ruled against the actions, the Supreme Court’s 
ideological leaning on the constitutionality of DACA/DAPA is unclear.282  
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With the passing of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia in February, the Court is likely to 
split 4-4, with Justice Elena Kagan (Democrat, appointed by Barack Obama), Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor (Democrat, appointed by Barack Obama), Justice Stephen Breyer (Democrat, 
appointed by Bill Clinton), and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Democrat, appointed by Bill 
Clinton) on the liberal side of the court, likely to vote in favor of the U.S. government, and 
Justice Samuel Alito (Republican, appointed by George W. Bush), Chief Justice John Roberts 
(Republican, appointed by George W. Bush), Justice Clarence Thomas (Republican, appointed by 
George H.W. Bush) and possibly Justice Anthony Kennedy (Republican, appointed by Ronald 
Reagan) on the conservative side of the court, likely to vote against the U.S. government. In this 
scenario, the Supreme Court would uphold the appellate decision striking down the executive 
actions on an APA violation. Alternatively, the Court may order the case to be reargued once a 
new justice is sworn in who could break the deadlock. In any case, the justices’ constitutional 
assessment will ultimately depend on their respective understandings of Executive power which 
point to different conclusions.  
 As this research paper has demonstrated, there is strong evidence that President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s stewardship theory, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s prerogative theory, and 
Zeisberg’s relational model support the president’s executive actions. To recall, Theodore 
Roosevelt’s stewardship theory held that the president can do anything not explicitly forbidden 
by the Constitution or by laws passed by Congress. FDR’s prerogative theory held that the 
president’s executive powers broaden when faced with emergency situations, such as war. In 
tandem, these theories justify President Obama’s decision to act on immigration by creating the 
extended DACA and DAPA programs for: 1) the president did not act contrary to an explicit 
denial of power in the Constitution or laws passed by Congress; and 2) the president acted when 
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faced with an illegal immigration crisis that today includes roughly 11 million undocumented 
immigrants, or about 3.5 percent of the U.S. population, residing in the country.  
 Zeisberg’s relational model, which states that branches of government generate 
constitutional authority when they “mobilize their institutional capacities, develop good 
understandings of the security needs of the moment, and place themselves in responsive 
relationship,"  justifies President Obama’s executive actions still more specifically.283 With 
respect to DACA/DAPA, the Executive Branch has fulfilled its constitutional responsibilities far 
better than the Legislative Branch, which has failed to properly act on immigration. Whereas the 
president has deported an unprecedented number of undocumented immigrants (which he is able 
to deport with the resources Congress has allotted it) and owing to these limited resources has 
used his discretionary power to fulfill his domestic and foreign policy powers, Congress, as an 
institution, has not fulfilled its constitutional responsibility to reform the country’s outdated 
immigration laws. In light of Congress’ failures and the Executive’s responsible conduct, the 
president has rightfully generated the constitutional authority to promulgate DACA and DAPA. 
Yet, the justices may also adopt a more conservative interpretation of executive powers, 
one which narrowly limits the Executive Branch’s ability to enact policy in immigration. For 
example, President William Howard Taft’s constitutional theory, which stated that the president 
derived his powers strictly from powers enumerated in the Constitution or granted by Congress, 
would rule DACA/DAPA as constitutionally groundless. This interpretation of executive power 
is weak in part because of the increase of executive powers over time, which have generally 
allowed the president broader domestic and foreign policy powers than ever before, and the rise 
of the administrative state in the U.S. contemporary practice of government, which puts into 
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question whether the courts, even the Supreme Court, has any role—obligated or empowered—to 
serve as a check on the actions of administrative agencies such as DHS.284 There are reasons, to 
be sure, to be concerned about whether these developments are endangering the constitutional 
system of separate and limited powers and checks and balances. Nonetheless, the strongest case 
lies in favor of President Obama’s actions. 
 
V.   Conclusion  
 
 As contentious and polarizing as immigration has become in recent years, this does not 
remove the U.S. government’s responsibility to coherently and appropriately address the illegal 
immigration issues that currently plague the nation. The government as a whole has acted mostly 
irresponsibly in both enacting law and enforcing it, to the detriment of millions of hardworking 
and otherwise law-abiding immigrants and their families. However, as this research paper has 
proved, of the two branches responsible for enacting and enforcing immigration policies, there is 
no question that the Executive Branch has acted with the most responsibility and coherency in 
addressing the illegal immigration crisis of today. By creating DACA in 2012, the president has 
provided deportation relief to nearly one million undocumented youth, and hopes to do the same 
with the extension of DACA and DAPA, announced in 2014, which would provide deportation 
relief to millions of undocumented immigrants, many of whom are the parents of Americans 
raised on U.S. soil. Congressional deadlock in passing comprehensive immigration reform does 
not alone justify the actions President Obama has taken and hopes to take. It is equally the 
Executive Branch’s responsible conduct, as outlined in the assessment of President Obama’s 
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actions under the relational conception, that has allowed it to generate the constitutional authority 
to do so. The Supreme Court must recognize this significant fact and rule accordingly by lifting 
the injunction and letting DACA/DAPA proceed implementation immediately.   
 Aside from its constitutional legitimacy, lifting the injunction on DACA/DAPA would be 
both beneficial to the U.S. as a whole and simply, the right thing to do. DACA/DAPA would be 
beneficial to the country as a whole in that the initiatives would benefit millions of people, their 
families and their communities. They would allow employed undocumented individuals, 
previously too afraid to come out of the shadows for fear of deportation, to finally come out and 
have access to better jobs and improved working conditions. The economic benefits too would be 
plentiful. By providing deferred action to employed undocumented immigrants, the programs 
would benefit the economy at large, much like DACA has, “by permitting greater levels of 
contribution to the workforce by educated individuals who previously had limited employment 
opportunities.”285 DACA/DAPA would also be beneficial because they would allow families, at 
least temporarily, to stay together and feel secure as a family unit. 
 Despite its benefits, DACA/DAPA does not solve the core deficiencies in the current U.S. 
immigration system and nor does it provide the true relief that undocumented immigrants so 
desperately need and deserve: a path to citizenship. Congress must once and for all set aside 
politics and do its job. As President Obama stated in his announcement of DACA/DAPA in 
November of 2014: “We are and always will be a nation of immigrants. We were strangers 
once, too. And whether our forebears were strangers who crossed the Atlantic, or the Pacific, or 
the Rio Grande, we are here only because this country welcomed them in, and taught them that 
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to be an American is about something more than what we look like, or what our last names are, 
or how we worship. What makes us Americans is our shared commitment to an ideal -– that all 
of us are created equal, and all of us have the chance to make of our lives what we will.”286 And 
thus, not just undocumented immigrants, but rather, America can no longer wait. 
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